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THE "ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION" CONSTRAINT:
GETTING AWAY WITH SILENCE
Luke M. Milligan*
INTRODUCTION
The presidencies of William J. Clinton and George W. Bush are in many ways
kindred. It seems certain that both will be noted by historians for their determined
and mechanistic evasions of public scrutiny. The misleading insinuations, failed
memories, perjuries, obstructions of justice, and novel assertions of executive privi-
lege have been exposed sharply and criticized roundly by Congress, academics, and
the press.' Still, there is a particular tactic of presidential evasion, utilized by
Clinton and Bush alike, that has been left undisturbed.' This is the White House's
increasingly regular practice of claiming that the President and his advisors are
"constrained" from publicly commenting on particular matters due to the existence
of an "ongoing criminal investigation." In many minds, the invocation of this con-
straint-no matter the circumstances-reflexively transforms a White House
stonewall into an instance of "responsible" and "principled" presidential restraint.'
Perhaps not surprisingly, both administrations have failed to address even the most
basic issues surrounding this constraint. Issues such as: What are its origins? Are
these origins legitimate? And how far does the constraint reach? (The Bush
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. I would like to
thank Les Abramson, Jim Jones, and Russ Weaver for their insightful and pointed criticisms.
See, e.g., TED GUP, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE (2007); GEOFFREY R. STONE, ToP SECRET: WHEN OUR
GOVERNMENT KEEPS Us IN THE DARK (2007); Neil Kinkopf, Executive Privilege: The
Clinton Administration in the Courts, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 631 (2000); Mark J.
Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52
DUKE L.J. 403 (2002).
2 This does not suggest that the tactic has not been realized by members of the press
corps. See Dan Froomkin, Some Explaining to Do, washingtonpost.com, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2007/03/07/BL2007030701183.html (Mar. 7,
2007) ("[T]he stench of corruption has taken formal residence at the White House. The
president and vice president can pretend it's not there, and can continue to hide behind their
weak and transparent excuse for not commenting on an 'ongoing criminal investigation.').
3 See, e.g., Press Briefing, DanaPerino, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 6,2007), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070306-5.html ("I think the President
has had a very principled and responsible stand to not comment on the ongoing criminal matter
in any way, shape, or form."); Froomkin, supra note 2 ("[T]he main reason they are hiding
behind these excuses is that they can. There's been no public cost to them not talking.").
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administration, at one point, went so far as to claim that the very assertion of the
constraint barred the President from discussing such foundational issues.4 )
One point should be emphasized from the outset. The Presidents have not simply
claimed that they elect to refrain from public comment. Of course, any person, public
official or not, can elect to ignore questions from the press so long as they are pre-
pared to pay the political and social consequences of elective silence.5 The Presi-
dents have instead attributed their silence to an external constraint on their freedom
to make a public comment. To put it another way, it is the difference between claim-
ing that one may remain silent and claiming that one must.
The plausible justifications for an "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
on presidential commenting seem to be, at casual glance, wide-ranging. One might
intuitively think of the rules maintaining grand jury secrecy,6 the constitutional
obligation to faithfully execute the laws,7 or the pardon power.8 One might also
think of prevalent social norms, such as the belief that it is unfair to assign guilt in
a public forum without due process of law. Each of these justifications is legitimate.
Yet, importantly, the force of each is highly dependent on context. A particular
justification, for instance, might apply fully to Department of Justice (DOJ) inves-
tigations, partially to federal trials, and not at all during the appeals processes. A
different justification, however, might apply partially (yet never fully) during inves-
tigations, trials, and appeals.
The current ambiguity surrounding the "ongoing criminal investigation" con-
straint undoubtedly impairs democratic self-governance. The relationship between
the public and the President is widely understood as one of principal and agent.9 In
the most basic form of this model, the public delegates discretionary power to well-
motivated Presidents and withholds or withdraws discretion from ill-motivated
ones.' Working within this framework, the ill-motivated Presidents, when faced
with an empowered press corps, are boxed into the costly trilemma of disclosing ill
motives, lying about ill motives, or evading the topic of ill motives." Importantly,
' See Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-3.html.
' See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I & V. While the invocation of the right against self-
incrimination cannot be used to establish the invoker's guilt, it can be costly nonetheless.
See generally Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that certain forms of pre-
arrest silence can be used to impeach a defendant's testimony); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976) (ruling that, in civil matters, adverse inferences can be imputed from certain
forms of silence).
6 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
' Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
9 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
865, 866 (2007).
10 See id. at 883-84.
"Id. at 885 (arguing that the "credibility dilemma becomes most acute" when the
presidential communications privilege is invoked); see also Rozell, supra note 1, at 411-13
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the ill-motivated executives can escape this trilemma by citing to an external
constraint on their freedom to publicly comment. Such constraints make evasion
easier to disguise, which dissipates the force of the trilemma and causes broad
swaths of information to be unnecessarily shrouded from the public. It is therefore
imperative that the scope of the external constraints be narrowly tailored to the
discrete executive obligations that called for their design.
This Article seeks to arm the public, and the press corp in particular, with an
analytical framework by which they can evaluate the legitimacy of future
invocations of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint. Part I sets forth the
relationship between the public and the President. It frames the office of the
President in a principal-agent model, demonstrates that a significant degree of public
monitoring occurs through press relations, and explains why the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint is of particular value to the White House. Part II
documents the recent expansion of the constraint and describes how the Clinton
administration's justifications for refusing public comment helped establish the
normative framework within which the Bush administration enacted a policy of
silence. Part I, the core of the Article, deconstructs the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint, parses it into its incumbent strains of "positive,"
"constitutional," and "good citizenship" obligations, and discerns the bounds of the
constraint by testing each strain under varying conditions. In the light of this
analysis, Part IV criticizes the recent expansion of the "ongoing criminal investiga-
tion" constraint, proposes a new, tailored constraint, and explains how adherence to
this new rule will facilitate stricter public monitoring of the President.
I. ExEcuTivE POWER AND THE "ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION" CONSTRAINT
The White House press corps is central to the public monitoring process in that
it presents ill-motivated Presidents with the trilemma of disclose, lie, or evade. The
following paragraphs describe the trilemma, discuss the press's unique ability to
enforce the trilemma, and explain why the "ongoing criminal investigation" con-
straint is of particular value to the White House.
A. Executive Signals and the Trilemma
The President is widely perceived as an agent of the public.12 Stated at a most
general level, the public will grant the President discretion when it believes "that the
(discussing the inevitable credibility impairments following assertions of the presidential
communication privilege).
12 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 875-76. For an example of how the
agency framework resonates in the popular consciousness, see Jim Rutenberg, Bush Aide's
Celebrity Meeting Becomes a Global Warming Run-In, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at A16
(quoting a popular recording artist complaining to a White House Senior Aide, "You can't
speak to us like that, you work for us").
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benefits of doing so outweigh the risks of executive abuse."' 3 Conversely, the public
will constrain the executive by withdrawing or withholding discretion when it believes
"that the risks and harms of abuses outweigh any benefits in security or other goods."'
4
The public, however, does not have access to all the information it feels it needs
to calibrate its grants of discretion to the President. '5 For one, most executive de-
cisions are never subjected to a formal system of external review. 16 And even in
settings where judicial review of executive branch action is considered a central
tool, like agency enforcement of regulations, 7 there is always a considerable amount
of information which, for various reasons, remains concealed from the public.
As a result of this information gap, the public naturally shifts its monitoring
efforts toward deciphering signals of presidential motives.' 8  Within this signaling
13 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 866. Professor Cu6lar defines "discretion" as
"the extent of legal flexibility to use government power vested in executive branch officials."
Mariano-Florentino Cu6l1ar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 227,
236 (2006) (observing that "[t]he distinctions that lawyers and policymakers fight over tend
to be about whether to give the executive branch relatively more, or relatively less discretion
compared to a certain baseline").
'4 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 866. There are many ways in which the public
can withdraw discretion. Obviously, if the President is in his first term, the public can thwart
his re-election bid. There is formal judicial review of some types of executive actions.
Public pressure, stoked by Congress and the press, can mount to the point where the Attorney
General is compelled to appoint a Special Counsel. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219 (2000).
Congress can rein in the President through rejection of the President's policy agenda, strictly
worded appropriations bills, oversight hearings, closure, or impeachment. Congress could
also set forth a non-binding statement of disapproval. And it has been argued that Congress
could enact legislation to force the President and other cabinet officials to appear before
Congress to answer questions about policy, in a procedure akin to the "Question Time" found
in Commonwealth nations. See Alex Hontos, Note, The Executive Reports, We Decide: The
Constitutionality of an Executive Branch Question and Report Period, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1047 (2007).
"5 Professor Wolfe explains that "one of the rock-solid findings of empirical political
science research" is that "American voters possess scant information about politics and
policy." See ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 24 (2006). For
interesting discussions of the potential ways to monitor executive discretion, see Cuflar,
supra note 13, at 252-74; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking
Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
6 Such review is often the most effective way to get information to the public. See
Cu6llar, supra note 13, at 229-30 ("[T]he hallmark of many executive decisions often proves
to be nearly unfettered discretion.").
'7 Id. at 243 (observing that judicial review of agency action, with Chevron deference,
amounts to almost no judicial review at all).
18 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 866. Samuel Popkin refers to these, somewhat
affectionately, as decisions of "low-information rationality." SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 9 (2d
ed. 1994).
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framework, there are three primary ways for a President to proceed when the public
inquires into topics in which he holds ill motives. First, he can cut his losses and
disclose the information revealing his bad motives. The expected costs here are self-
evident. Second, he can give affirmatively false or otherwise misleading answers. The
expected costs here are also high. The lie, if exposed, results in costs to the President
that are exponential compared to those he would have incurred by a straightforward
disclosure of bad news.' 9 Third, the President can refuse to answer. The scholarly
literature, however, overwhelmingly concludes that evasive behavior signals culpa-
bility.20 The basic idea is that any information withheld is generally interpreted as
being negative to the withholder's interests.2' One can see that each of these
options-disclose, lie, or evade-signals ill motives and likely leads the public to
withdraw or withhold discretion from the President. These three not-so-good
alternatives constitute the trilemma of the ill-motivated President.
B. Presidential Press Relations
The trilemma of the ill-motivated President largely dissipates when the public
is unable to detect executive evasion. That said, the public has various tools with
which to identify evasion. While congressional hearings and other independent
investigations might reflexively come to mind, it seems likely that the press corps
is the most regular and thorough detector of White House evasion.
The first seventy-five years of the United States of America constituted the era
of the administration "organ."22 During this period, it could hardly be said that the
19 Some lies are, in the public eye, more damnable than others. Presidents Nixon and
Clinton, of course, had their policy agendas undone by lies. It is, however, common
throughout American history for the public to forgive administration lies about some matters,
such as the health of the President. See, e.g., W. DALE NELSON, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE
PRESIDENT?: THE WHIrrE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FROM CLEVELAND TO CLINTON 10-11
(1983) (documenting that President Grover Cleveland's staff lied to the press about his health
condition with impunity).
20 See Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications, 12 BELL J. OF EcON. 380 (1981) (demonstrating that no news is bad news);
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND
J. OF EcON. 18 (1986). For a discussion of how game-theory impacts the law of adverse
inferences, see Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 487
(2000). The authors conclude that "silence in the face of accusations is largely a reliable
signal of guilt." Id.
21 For example, the Democratic National Committee did not refer to President Clinton's
testimony about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky as "evasive." Rather, it argued in a
far more benign tone that Clinton "drew the line at going into explicit detail.... He declined
to discuss specific encounters in a graphic and gratuitous way." See Jill Lawrence, Video
Verdict: Tape Falls Short, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 1998, at 3A.
22 See JAMES E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS 70 (1947). An organ was a
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President and the general press corps enjoyed relations of any kind.23 For starters,
newspapermen had almost no direct access to the President.24 Moreover, Presidents
rarely responded to allegations or issues percolating in the press. President George
Washington, in the first draft of his Farewell Address, surmised on the newspaper
attacks against him: "I shall pass them over in utter silence never having myself, nor
by any other with my participation or knowledge, written or published a Scrap in
answer to any of them."25 Even after the demise of the organ in the mid-nineteenth
century, there were only slight advancements in presidential press relations. Presi-
dents granted interviews only intermittently,26 and their press conferences were notably
one-sided affairs, with the President setting all of the terms in his favor, such as strict
rules relating to transcripts and attribution (which allowed him to in effect cherry pick
the issues in which he felt most secure and ignore the others off the record).27 It is only
at the mid-point of the twentieth century, with emerging forms of technology shifting
the balance of power between the White House and the press corps, that we can begin
to see the formation of the modem presidential press conference.2 s
The current structure of presidential press relations is an effective means to
enforce the trilemma of the ill-motivated President. First, press conferences occur
with regularity. It is understood that the President will take questions from the press
at least once per month. 29 No matter how unpopular or inartful a President, his regular
appearance before a room of inquiring journalists is now a foregone conclusion. 30
newspaper that could be relied on to defend the administration from allegations which
manifested in the so-called opposition press. The organ was normally published by a loyal
party member or personal friend of the President. Id.
23 The press could, however, communicate evasive behavior that had been identified by
other entities such as Congress, political opponents, or foreign nations.
24 POLLARD, supra note 22, at vi.
25 Id. at 23. Also in the first draft of his Farewell Address, Washington stated: "[I1t might
be expected at the parting scene of my public life that I should take some notice of such
virulent abuse." Id.
26 The first were granted by Andrew Johnson, though it would be several decades before
the presidential interview would become an expected requirement of the job. Id. at 413.
27 The first press conferences are attributed to Theodore Roosevelt. NELSON, supra note
19, at 18-20.
28 Generally speaking, this came about due to maturation of technologies (telegraph,
radio, television), changing economic conditions (consolidation and better organization of
media outlets), and the precedent of access set by charismatic populists like Presidents
Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt.
29 For instance, during their terms, President Clinton averaged thirty news conferences
per year, and the first President Bush averaged thirty-three. President Reagan, however, held
a mere average ofjust over five per year. See Presidential News Conferences, The American
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/newsconferences.php (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007).
30 Facing sliding poll numbers, President Nixon asked the White House Correspondents
Association for suggestions on how to improve his press conferences. Their answer: hold
more of them. NELSON, supra note 19, at 174-75.
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Second, Presidential press relations are relatively thorough. They allow
journalists to directly confront the President and create a record of his statements.
Before the dawn of the press conference, there were no effective means to publicly
examine Presidents. The White House's failure to address an issue did not neces-
sarily signal evasiveness--even the most severe populist, after all, would recognize
that Presidents lacked the resources to respond to every allegation percolating in the
papers. But when Presidents began to hold press conferences, and thereby carve out
time from their schedules for the specific purpose of fielding questions, the
"constrained resources" justification lost its force.3' And with the Eisenhower ad-
ministration's decision to televise press conferences,32 rendering moot the protective
non-attribution rules, Presidents' every comment and expression was exposed fully
to the public.33 Today, Presidents are peppered with questions about a wide range
of sensitive and potentially embarrassing topics. These events are broadcast widely
and quickly, and any straightforward comment by Presidents that they refuse to
address a particular inquiry invariably leaves the public with the feeling that the ad-
ministration has something to hide.34 It is not surprising that every President's first
goal of a press encounter, as true now as in the radio age in which Charles Willis
Thompson famously said it, is to keep from being "trapped into uttering that
sentence that has damned so many who have used it, 'I refuse to answer."'
' 35
The current structure of White House press relations permits journalists to
identify presidential evasiveness like never before. Accordingly, the White House
31 Presidential press secretaries, from the beginning, were charged to disguise presidential
evasiveness. George Cortelyou, President William McKinley's presidential secretary, had
the duty of "tell[ing] the newspaper correspondents what they should know without seeming
to suppress information." POLLARD, supra note 22, at 559 (emphasis added) (quoting Albert
Halstead, The President at Work, INDEP., Sept. 5, 1901, at 2080-86). Along these lines,
Nixon's spokesman, Ron Ziegler, is widely viewed to have been ineffective for evoking
suspicion and evasiveness. NELSON, supra note 19, at 166-81.
32 See NELSON, supra note 19, at 115-117 (discussing the televising of press conferences).
" The press conference has been compared to the "Prime Minister's Questions" of
Commonwealth nations. For more on this, see Nixon's comment that British Question Time
is more taxing than U.S. presidential press conferences. See Remarks on Departure from
Britain, 1 PUB. PAPERS 149 (Feb. 26, 1969). For a discussion of how Presidents restricted
the release of transcripts and recording devices and how they punished reporters who
breached non-attribution agreements, see POLLARD, supra note 22, at 773-778.
" See William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress's Authority to Investigate the
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 810.
35 CHARLES WILIS THOMPSON, PRESIDENTS I'VE KNOWN AND Two NEAR PRESIDENTS
119 (1929). Not only does such a refusal impair credibility (both specific and general), but
it fails to dispose of thorny issues. The questions will continue to be asked, the pressure to
respond will generally increase with time, and the public will eventually punish the President
(e.g., calling for investigations by Congress or a Special Counsel or through other, indirect
means, such as the concerted obstruction of his policy agenda).
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press corps is the public's key enforcement mechanism of the trilemma for the ill-
motivated President.
C. Escaping the Trilemma
With the understanding that the modem press efficiently enforces the trilemma
of the ill-motivated President, it is important to examine the ways in which the
President is able to escape the trilemma. Presidents can, when faced with inquiries
about topics in which they hold ill motives, claim that they lack a recollection of the
operative facts. Yet this is a costly option as it suggests detachment or incom-
petency.36 By far the most credible way for ill-motivated Presidents to escape the
trilemma is by pointing to an external constraint on their freedom to respond. This,
in effect, links their silence to a good greater than the maintenance of their own
political capital. They effectively say to all those who want more information: "Do
not blame us! Blame the constraint!"
The White House invariably prefers that constraints be drawn as broadly as
possible. This is due to the fact that, as the constraint widens, more and more topics can
be ignored without signaling evasion to the public. While providing obvious bene-
fits to the White House, expansive constraints exact few costs from Presidents. An
executive, barred by an overly-broad constraint, yet looking to clear his adminis-
tration of false allegations of malfeasance, will simply (1) acquiesce to selective
leaks of exculpating information, or (2) rely on loyalists from outside of his admin-
istration to promote the exculpating information.
Of the external constraints available to Presidents, one of the most valuable, and
least discussed, is that protecting the sanctity of "ongoing criminal investigations."
Most citizens have not contemplated the origins of this constraint. Its widespread
acceptance is most likely explained by the simple fact that it appears relatively
innocuous to the majority of the press and public.37 First, each invocation is
36 For an example, see President Ronald Reagan's claim that he had no knowledge of the
Iran-Contra dealings. See Gerald M. Boyd, White House Happy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1987,
at Al. For an example of claiming lack of recollection, see Alberto Gonzales on the firing
of U.S. Attorneys. See Eric Lipton, No-Confidence Resolution on Gonzales Is Scheduled,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 2007, at A10. Both Reagan and Gonzales suffered politically as a result.
A different method of escape, though of limited applicability, is refusing to speculate or
answer hypothetical questions. See, e.g., Tad Szulc, Ex-G.O.P. Aide Linked to Political
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1972, at Al (quoting Ron Ziegler, White House Press Secretary,
as saying, "I'm not going to comment from the White House on a third-rate burglary
attempt"); Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20O3/10/20O31001 -6.html (refusing
to discuss anonymous allegations made in the press).
3' Heuristics are mental rules of thumb that are shared by large portions of the population.
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky claimed in a series of papers that "people
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing
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invariably associated with its prior uses, 38 and nearly all Americans have heard the
constraint asserted, at one time or another, by serious-minded public officials facing
down aggressive, sensationalistic journalists. Think of the police chief who, the night
of a large fire, is asked whether "foul play was involved." Or think of the member
of the 9/11 Commission who is asked about his impression of witness testimony prior
to the issuance of the committee's official report. Second, the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint is valuable to the White House because it implies a temporal
limit. Unlike some justifications for executive silence, such as the privileges relating
to presidential communications or deliberative process, the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint suggests that the public will eventually hear from the
executive branch (i.e., when the investigation has concluded). Third, the constraint
reminds the public that government officials are working to resolve the problem.
Fourth, the terminology of "ongoing criminal investigation," unlike the constraints
relating to "deliberative process" or "presidential communications," suggests that it
was articulated in advance of the inquiry as necessary to promote an identifiable
executive function.39 It is for these reasons that the public and press have remained
relatively passive as the White House has applied the scope to novel circumstances.
Presidents strive to conceal their ill motives from the American public. The press
corps, due to its regular and thorough Presidential relations, presents a trilemma for the
White House as it forces it to choose one of three costly options: disclose, lie, or evade.
Ill-motivated Presidents, however, can escape the trilemma by citing to an external
constraint on their ability to comment. A constraint enjoying particular credibility in
the public eye is that pertaining to "ongoing criminal investigations." The next Part
documents how the White House has expanded the reach of this constraint.
11. THE EXPANSION OF THE "ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION" CONSTRAINT
The "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint has been significantly expanded
in recent years. Presidents have traditionally behaved as though this constraint applies
only to matters over which they have had at least nominal control. But over the past
two presidential administrations, there seems to have been an effort to extend the
constraint from its historical domain to cover matters independent of the Presidents'
control. The recent expansion can be traced to the late 1990s when President
Clinton and his spokespeople repeatedly asserted that it was "proper" and "right" to
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations." DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
PAUL SLOVIC & AMos TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
3 (1982).
38 This would be an application of the "availability" heuristic. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Hazardous Heuristics 2-2 (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 165,2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=344620.
39 See THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 20 (Francesco Parisi &
Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005) (discussing the value of articulation in game theory).
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refuse to comment publicly about the Whitewater investigation. 40 President George
W. Bush, working within Clinton's normative framework, crystallized the expansion
into an administration policy that has been followed with remarkable consistency.4'
As will be shown, this expansion of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
has effectively immunized a substantial amount of presidential silence from charges
of evasion.
A. The Traditional Constraint
The White House has historically behaved as though it were constrained from
commenting on the merits, progress, or information gathered during ongoing federal
criminal investigations or prosecutions of which the President is perceived to be at
least nominally in control.42 Such "control" is thought to exist if the President can
obtain access to or exert direct influence over the investigation.43
1. Investigations Under the President's Control
The first presidential reference to the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
likely occurred in 1867. President Andrew Johnson, facing the prospect of impeach-
ment, wove his way through the American interior and, along the way, granted a series
of press interviews-the first of their kind by a U.S. President.' At one point, a
correspondent of the New York World asked Johnson for his views on the pending case
of William McCardle, a newspaper publisher who had been detained by U.S. military
authorities for allegedly obstructing federal reconstruction efforts.45 Johnson quietly
explained that the matter was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court and that it was
improper for him to express an opinion in advance of the Court's decision.'
40 See infra Part II.B.2.
41 See infra Part II.C.
42 This would include primarily investigations by the Departments of Justice and Defense
but would of course extend to agency investigations as well.
13 The President can be considered, in a sense, the chief prosecutor of the United States
in that he has access to or influence over all federal investigations unless he decrees
otherwise, as in the case where a Special Counsel is appointed. See Saikrishna Prakash, The
ChiefProsecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521 (2005). Although Professor Prakash has noted
his disagreement, the Supreme Court has unambiguously upheld the power of Congress to
remove the President from the control of a federal prosecution. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
44 POLLARD, supra note 22, at 413.
45 Id. at 423. McCardle, an editor from Vicksburg, Mississippi, had been arrested and
detained by military authorities "on the charge of criticizing that authority and the
Reconstruction policy." Id. at 423 n.70.
46 Id. at 423.
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Over the 135 years since Johnson's interview with the World, Presidents have
rigorously followed Johnson's precedent and refused to comment on general
investigative matters pursued by their administrations' departments or agencies. Some
of the more famous examples include President Richard Nixon's public silence
regarding the FBI's investigation of Justice Abe Fortas,47 President Gerald Ford's
refusal to comment on whether he would pardon Nixon,48 and the refusal of President
Ronald Reagan to comment publicly on the federal prosecution and conviction of his
would-be assassin.4 9 Another, more recent, example is President George W. Bush's
refusal to comment about the investigation into abuses at Abu Ghraib. Bush's press
secretary explained that "[i]f the Commander-in-Chief says anything that might be
regarded as prejudicial to the proceedings, those who are conducting the inquiries and
those who might be called upon to conduct trials are... going to be hamstrung."50
The so-called Travelgate controversy of the early 1990s offers a good case study
on the impropriety of presidential commenting on investigations within their control.
The Clinton administration fired numerous travel personnel who had served during
George H. W. Bush's administration. 5' In response to claims that the firings were
politically motivated, the administration suggested that the employees had been fired
because they were under investigation by the FBI for alleged criminal activities."
In the face of enormous public criticism, the White House promptly recanted its
comments, chalked it up to its lack of experience, and assured the public that it
would not again divulge information about ongoing FBI investigations. 3
17 Fred P. Graham, Mitchell Confirms that He Gave Warren 'Certain Information 'About
Fortas, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1969, at 23.
48 NELSON, supra note 19, at 185 ("[U]ntil any legal process has been undertaken, I think
it is unwise and untimely for me to make any commitment.").
41 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley Is Cleared but Is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1982, at Al, D27 ("No comment all the way. We haven't commented on any
aspect of this, and we won't comment now.").
" Press Briefing, Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (June 1, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060601-5.html ("What you don't want
is ... somebody saying ...here's what the President had to say-because that
suddenly-here's the President, all [the prosecutors] answer to him, you've got to be very
careful."). The current Bush administration similarly refused to comment on the FBI's
investigation into allegations that Sandy Berger, Clinton's National Security Advisor,
unlawfully removed and destroyed files from the national archives. Press Briefing, Scott
McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/releases/2004/07/print/20040721-6.html.
"' For a discussion of the events of Travelgate, see Joe Conason, Travelgate: The Untold
Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 40.
52 See Press Briefing, George Stephanopoulos, White House Press Sec'y (May 21,1993),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60159.
" See Press Briefing, Mack McLarty, White House Chief of Staff (July 2, 1993),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60182 ("[T]he communication was
not as it should have been between certain parts of the White House and the Communications
people that briefed the press.").
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2. Investigations Outside of the President's Control
Although Presidents have felt constrained from publicly commenting about
investigations nominally under their control, they have historically followed a
different practice when it comes to investigations definitively beyond their control.54
In relation to such "independent" investigations, Presidents have regularly adopted
the utilitarian mantra held by all private citizens who are asked to comment about
investigations: speak up when you feel that it will help your cause; shut up when
you feel it will help your cause."
Both Watergate and Iran-Contra illustrate this point. President Richard Nixon,
just three days after appointing Archibald Cox as Special Prosecutor, gave a detailed
public explanation of his involvement in Watergate, where he defended himself and
went on to insinuate that laws had been broken by individuals within his administra-
tion.56 Several months later, Nixon held a press conference to publicly explain an
allegedly incriminating conversation between himself and his former Attorney
General.57 And, regarding the charges against White House aides, Nixon promised
" This "control" distinction is nicely illustrated by Herbert Hoover's public comments
regarding the investigations into the conduct of his Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman
Wilbur. The Department of Justice investigated allegations that Wilbur had improperly
invested funds in companies which he regulated. See POLLARD, supra note 22, at 750-51.
At the same time, students at Stanford University, where Hoover served as a trustee, called
for a proceeding to force Wilbur to resign his post as the university's president (a position
he was holding in abeyance while working in Hoover's Cabinet). See Valuable Wilbur, TIME,
Oct. 27, 1930, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,787627,00
.html. While Hoover felt constrained from discussing the ongoing federal investigation, he
freely commented on the independent investigation into Wilbur's status at Stanford. The
President's News Conference of October 14, 1930, 1 PUB. PAPERS 432,432 (Oct. 14, 1930)
("The University will gladly extend his leave as long as it is necessary .... Being one of the
trustees of that institution myself, I can speak with more authority than the student daily.").
It is unclear how much authority Hoover, as trustee, would have had in any eventual
university proceeding. If his authority had been substantial, Hoover arguably should have
withheld comment about his views of Lyman. But then again, the matter was not criminal,
and thus the policy justifications for withholding comment would, of course, have had far
less force.
" Compare Bill Carter, HBO Chairman Held in Dispute with Girlfriend, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2007, at C7 (quoting an attorney for an HBO executive, who was charged with
domestic assault, that it would be inappropriate to comment while there was an ongoing
criminal investigation), with Enron's Ken Lay: I Was Fooled, CBS NEWS, July 8, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/05/60minutes/main706398.shtml.
56 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Nixon on Watergate: A Shrinking Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1973, at 29 (discussing segments of Nixon's press release). These statements were far more
extensive than those provided from the White House before the appointment of Cox.
17 John Herbers, A Rare News Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1973, at 1.
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the American public that "[w]hen all the facts come out, when they have an opportunity
to have their cases heard in court... they will be exonerated."58 Throughout the entire
independent investigation, it was never once suggested by Nixon, Congress, or the
press that it was improper for Presidents to publicly defend themselves and members
of their administration from insinuations of wrongdoing.
During the Iran-Contra scandal, President Ronald Reagan implemented a less
aggressive, but similarly public, strategy. The White House public relations office
was expressly charged "to be ready with a forceful and detailed [public] rebuttal of
any charge that Mr. Reagan insists is not true., 59 Accordingly, upon the release of
the Independent Counsel's report, Reagan met with the press to defend himself,
stating that he had not been informed by Admiral John Poindexter of the money
funneled to Nicaraguan rebels. 60 At no point during the Iran-Contra investigation
did Reagan, Congress, the Independent Counsel, or the press assert that Presidents
were constrained from defending themselves through the press.
B. The Rhetoric of the Expanded Constraint
President Clinton began in the tradition of Presidents past. He did not comment
on matters over which he could potentially exert influence or enjoy access, and as
for independent investigations, he, like Nixon and Reagan before him, took a
utilitarian approach, answering questions when he thought it was to his advantage
and refusing to comment when that seemed to his advantage. But as the administra-
tion wore on, and the pressure to comment increased, Clinton and his spokespeople
began to frame their refusal to comment in attitudinal terms, suggesting that silence
was "proper" and "responsible." Whereas past Presidents simply stated that they
had decided not to comment,6' the Clinton administration took it a step farther,
routinely suggesting that a President in his position should not comment and that it
would be improper to do so. The following Section profiles how the Clinton
58 Id.
'9 Steven V. Roberts, Reagan Aides Look to Worst Case, Defending President Against
Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1987, at B6 ("[I]f a document is quoted out of context, or
someone makes a statement we think is not consistent with the sum total of what we believe
to be true, we will at least have the opportunity to respond.").
o Philip Shenon, Inquiry by Walsh Said to Scrutinize High U.S. Officials, N.Y. TMES,
Apr. 29, 1987, at Al (quoting Reagan as saying that Admiral Poindexter "thought he was
being, in some way, protective of me"). Reagan stated at a press conference that "both
Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger advised me strongly not to pursue the [Iranian
arms sale] initiative .... [I]t turned out they were right and I was wrong." Radio Address to
the Nation on National Security and Administration Goals, 1 PUB. PAPERS 245, 245 (Mar.
14, 1987).
6 For example, the Reagan administration simply stated that they were not going to
comment on any part of the Iran-Contra investigation. Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Won't
Comment on Admiral, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1987, at A7.
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administration handled inquiries into independent investigations, placing particular
emphasis on the ways in which its rhetoric differed from its actual practices.
1. Traditional Practice
When asked by the press about an investigation that was independent of the
influence of the White House, the Clinton administration, like past Presidents and
any citizen-target of an investigation,62 based its decision to comment solely on its
perception of its own self-interest. For example, where there was no upside to
commenting on independent investigations, such as the arrest of Representative
Charles Rangel by the New York City Police Department or the prosecution of O.J.
Simpson by the State of California, the administration elected to stay silent.63 Yet
when there was some upside to commenting, such as when the President felt he had
been unfairly characterized during aspects of the Whitewater investigation, the
administration commented freely.64
62 See, e.g., 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast July 8, 2005) (profiling the public
defense of Kenneth Lay, former CEO of Enron, to charges in a federal criminal indictment).
63 When asked to discuss the merits of the arrest of Congressman Charlie Rangel, the
press secretary responded,"There is an ongoing investigation and I don't think the President
wants to prejudge the result of that investigation." Press Briefing, Joe Lockhart, White House
Press Sec'y (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://www.presidency .ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4771 1.
This refusal to comment is the product of a straightforward cost-analysis: the benefit of
supporting Rangel was so small that it was outweighed by the negative consequences of
giving the appearance of meddling-a violation of a social norm-in an investigation about
which the President has no personal knowledge. See The President's News Conference with
President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1559 (Oct. 10, 1995) (reiterating that
he would not comment on the trial of O.J. Simpson).
6 Examples include public defenses of his relationship with Webster Hubbell. During the
investigation into Hubbell, Clinton's press secretary, Mike McCurry, provided an extraordinarily
detailed account of the President's recollection of and position on contested matters:
[W]e've asked [the President] again, in light of the documents from
those submitted by Mr. Ickes with respect to the phone calls suggested
to him by the DNC, does he have any recollection making those calls.
He says, no. In fact, he has more of a recollection that he did not make
calls as suggested by the DNC. They sent over a call sheet as they've
indicated. The Democratic National Committee has now indicated they
have no information that would suggest the President made those calls.
And on the second thing, the President still, to the best of his
recollection, says that he was not aware of Mr. Hubbell's retention by
the Lippo Group until he read about it in the press. As the Special
Counsel has said before ... the President never asked or suggested
anyone hire Webb Hubbell. The President does think he may have
heard from either Bernie Rapoport or Truman Arnold that they had
intended to hire Mr. Hubbell-we've said that previously.
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The administration's utilitarian approach to such press queries is best evinced
by its two-step response to the allegations that Clinton had suborned perjury from
Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern with whom he had an extramarital affair.65
In phase one-which constituted quick, circumspect, and bold denials of wrong-
doing-the public heard directly from the President.6 When asked by a news
anchor whether the allegations were true, Clinton responded: "That is not true. That
is not true. I did not ask anyone to tell anything other than the truth. There is no
improper relationship. And I intend to cooperate with this inquiry. But that is not
true. ' 67 Clinton infamously reiterated this denial five days later at a Rose Garden
press conference:
But I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you
to listen to me. I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual
relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody
to lie, not a single time-never. These allegations are false.68
It is clear that, during phase one of its strategy, the Clinton administration perceived
itself as free to publicly comment on independent investigations that threatened its
political status.
The day after Clinton's Rose Garden comments, the administration, however,
shifted gears and ushered in phase two of its public defense strategy: the stonewall.
It was unveiled by Hillary Clinton on a morning talk show.69 After making a few
final public arguments, like claiming that Starr's office was intimidating witnesses
and that his investigation was the product of a "vast right-wing conspiracy," she
officially signaled the administration's retreat to silence."0 The First Lady implored
the American public to "just wait and find out what the truth is" and then promised
that, as far as this issue goes, "[y]ou won't be hearing any more from my husband.'
Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 25, 1997), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48450.
65 This closely parallels the advice of Pat Buchanan and Ron Ziegler to President Nixon
in the early stages of Watergate: deny involvement and decline any other comment. NELSON,
supra note 19, at 176.
6 Clinton's press secretary also stated that Clinton did not suborn perjury and did not
have an improper relationship with Lewinsky. Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House
Press Sec'y (Jan. 21, 1998), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48182.
67 Interview with Jim Lehrer of the PBS "News Hour," 1 PUB. PAPERS 89 (Jan. 21, 1998).
68 Remarks on the After-School Child Care Initiative, 1 PUB. PAPERS 110, 111 (Jan. 26,
1998).
69 The Today Show (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 1998). For an article on Hillary
Clinton's interview on The Today Show, see David Maraniss, First Lady Launches
Counterattack, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1998, at Al.
70 The Today Show (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 1998).
7' Id.; Katharine Q. Seelye, A Second Stage in a Battle to Defend the President, N.Y.
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As it turned out, the President refused to comment on the matter for the next seven
months. 72 As with its decision to publicly comment and deny the allegations, the
administration's decision to remain silent was based on its perceived self-interest.
2. Expansive Rhetoric
Despite the administration's awareness that silence was strategic and self-
interested, Clinton and his spokespeople regularly laced their elective silence with
attitudinal terminology. An early instance of the use of such terminology followed
Clinton's interview with Independent Counsel Robert Fiske regarding the death of
Vince Foster: "As Mr. Fiske has said, it's a component of an ongoing investigation,
and I can't answer any questions specifically about what they may have talked
about. 73 The administration gave a similar response to press inquiries into whether
the White House Counsel's Office had any notes or documents reflecting the Presi-
dent's conversations about Whitewater. The administration told the press corps that
"[i]t's a matter under investigation and it's not-it would be proper for comments
on that to come from the independent counsel."74 Because in both of these situations
the obligation of confidentiality rested solely with the prosecutor rather than the
witness, Clinton had implied an external constraint where one did not exist.
Regarding the President's tactic to remain silent during phase two of the
administration's management of the Lewinsky scandal,75 his press secretary chose
to frame the calculating strategy in attitudinal terms of right and wrong: "I think the
President will properly, as he has indicated he wants to do at the proper time,
respond. But there are legal proceedings underway now in at least two different
venues, and I think it's important for those matters to run their course." 76 And when
asked when the President met Lewinsky, the administration similarly responded:
"The Counsel's Office elects to provide the President the opportunity to respond to
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A17 (describing the Clinton administration's general evasiveness
about Monica Lewinsky); see also John F. Harris, Say-Nothing Strategy Prevails, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 1998, at Al.
72 On August 17, 1998, the President publicly addressed the scandal and admitted that
he lied to the American people about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. See James
Bennet, Clinton Admits Lewinsky Liaison to Jury: Tells Nation 'It Was Wrong,' but Private,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998, at Al.
73 Press Briefing, Dee Dee Myers, White House Press Sec'y (June 13, 1994) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59866.
74 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Apr. 23, 1997) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48468.
7' Harris, supra note 71, at A17 ("Only on a not-for-attribution basis will White House
aides expand on this. Their allegation is that once Clinton offers a public version, Starr might
pressure Lewinsky to tailor her story so that it contradicts the president's.").
76 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 26, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48184.
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these types of questions in the proper forum. The proper forum which exists at this
point now is an inquiry by the Office of Independent Counsel and whatever other
legal venues are available.
7 7
After the press clamored for the release of certain records that the White House
had turned over to the Independent Counsel, Clinton's press secretary explained that
"they're in the custody of the independent counsel and we're cooperating with them
and we believe that we can't make them available at this point. '78 And over a series
of press conferences in the spring of 1998, President Clinton made the following
comments about the Lewinsky scandal:
I have already denied the legal charges, strongly, and I do so again.
But there is an ongoing investigation. Under those circumstances,
the right thing for me to do is to go back and do the job the
American people hired me to do, and that's what I am doing.7 9
Well, you know I'm not going to talk about that today. I can't.
I've got to do the work that the people of this country hired me
to do, so I can't-I'm not going to discuss that.80
The Clinton administration's use of attitudinal terms, such as "proper" and
"right," did little to quell the press corps. This is in part because the claim ran
contrary to the practices of past presidential administrations. And at one point,
Clinton's press secretary effectively acknowledged that there would be nothing
wrong with a President commenting on an independent investigation so long as he
was truthful.8' The press also argued that the normative tone of the denials was
17 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 29, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/?pid=48186. McCurry stated further
that "there has to be a proper forum in which you can bring out and present truth, and we
can't do it in a fashion in which we are responding to a cascade of allegations and stories and
developments that-and sources that are anonymous." Id. (emphasis added).
78 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 28, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48185.
" Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom
and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 174, 178 (Feb. 5, 1998) (emphasis added).
80 Remarks Prior to Discussions with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and
an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 354, 355 (Mar. 11, 1998) (emphasis added).
81 Q.: Mike, during Watergate, the President-there was a grand jury
investigation, congressional hearings, a special prosecutor-the
President and his spokesman at that time didn't feel constrained-
Mr. McCurry: Yes, and they did an awful lot of lying to the American
people. I remember that quite clearly. And that's one thing I'm not
going to do myself in this room.
Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 30, 1998), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48187.
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self-contradictory. They pointed out that, during the independent investigation into
potential violations of campaign finance laws, the White House had complied with
the press's request that it release certain records relating to the 1996 campaign. 2
Despite the fact that Clinton and his spokespeople did their very utmost to
implicitly frame the issue as one of constraint, they stopped short of explicitly point-
ing to a binding external constraint. This is made clear by the following dialogue
between Press Secretary Mike McCurry and the White House press corps:
Q.: Mike, can you try to disabuse us of the notion that you're
trying to use the investigation to-as a pretext to stop talking
about it?
Mr. McCurry: No.... I mean, it's in part the investigation; it's
in part the President feels like he has said what he is in a position
to say on the issue at this point.83
Q.: Mike, his refusal to answer questions doesn't mean that he
can't answer them.
Mr. McCurry: You're right.., they are not necessarily the same.' 4
McCurry later insinuated that the President's refusal to publicly release records
pertaining to Lewinsky was based on self-interest rather than any external constraint:
Q.: You're suggesting that there's a legal reason why you can't
make [the records] available.
Mr. McCurry: No, I'm just suggesting that we elect not to
because the independent counsel has a proceeding underway
and we choose not to release them at this time.
82 Q.: Mike, the campaign finance investigation was and is an ongoing
criminal grand jury investigation. Yet you folks released piecemeal a
lot of White House records in that case. Can you explain why you
didn't feel similarly constrained then as you do now?
Mr. McCurry: Because they are two different situations. In the case of
the campaign finance discussions, there were ongoing procedures on
Capitol Hill.
Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 29, 1998), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48186.
83 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 28, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48185.
" Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 29, 1998), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48186.
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Q.: What are the reasons, Mike?
Mr. McCurry: There are a number of them.
Q.: Legal reasons?
Mr. McCurry: Legal reasons. There are [sic] the fact that we
are in a hostile proceeding right now with a very determined
independent counsel; that we've got other legal actions that are
underway; and that there are going to have to be places and
venues in which the truth can prevail, and settings in which
witnesses can be examined and cross-examined. And those are
the settings in which in our system of justice the truth prevails
and justice is done.85
And in perhaps the most candid moment of the scandal, McCurry clarified the
position of the President as follows:
He's not in the position to comment.... Sometimes it's because
of the gag order of a court, other times it's because he elects not
to given the legal jeopardy he faces at the hands of a prosecutor
that others have suggested is out of control. So he's in the
situation he's in.86
So one can see that the Clinton administration, when pressured by the press
corps to justify its use of these attitudinal terms, tended to retreat to the utilitarian
argument that Clinton was in "legal jeopardy" and enmeshed in a "hostile proceed-
ing." The Clinton administration's use of attitudinal terms, a rudimentary
insinuation of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint, was thus easily
exposed as nothing more than a euphemism for those four unavoidably evasive
words: "I refuse to answer."
C. The Implementation of an Expanded Constraint
Although President Clinton insinuated an expanding "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint, his successor, President George W. Bush, would be the
first to benefit from the expansion. Clinton's repeated use of attitudinal terms, while
85 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 28, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48185.
86 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 6, 1998) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48204.
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generally unhelpful in his own bid to evade public scrutiny, laid the groundwork for
the Bush administration to do so. Bush is the first President to adopt a policy under
which he and his advisors were externally constrained from discussing matters that
were the subject of "ongoing criminal investigations" conducted outside of the
President's control.87 The following paragraphs document the emergence and reach
of this expanded form of the constraint.
1. The Constraint
In July 2003, the Bush White House was accused of leaking the name of a
covert CIA operative, Valerie Plame, in order to punish her husband, Joseph Wilson,
IV, who had been an outspoken critic of the administration's decision to invade
Iraq.88 When news of the leak first broke, the administration took the position that
it would not comment on anonymous allegations in the press.89 Once the DOJ
commenced its initial investigation, the White House kept its silence, explaining that
all inquiries about the matter should be directed to the DOJ.90 Under mounting
pressure from the press corps, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan
publicly defended three officials, two of whom were senior White House aides Karl
Rove and I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.9' Shortly thereafter, in October 2003,92 the
White House adopted a "policy" of not commenting on the leak because it was the
7 As one veteran Washington reporter, Walter Pincus, recently commented, "[E]ach
Administration has learned from the other, and... this group is just the cleverest I've ever
seen." Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Apr. 25, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/j oumal/btw/transcriptl.html).
18 The operative was outed in a column by Robert Novak. See Robert D. Novak, Op-Ed.,
Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A21 ("Wilson never worked for the CIA,
but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction.").
89 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Sept. 29,2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030929-7.html ("[I]t's not our practice to
go and try to chase down anonymous sources every time there's a report in the media.").
90 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 1, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031001-6.html ("The Department
of Justice is investigating this, they're the appropriate agency. As I have said earlier in the
week, that is where information should be reported.").
9' Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 10, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/l0/2003/20031010-6.html ("I spoke with
those individuals [Rove, Abrams, and Libby], as I pointed out, and those individuals assured
me they were not involved in this.").
92 In July 2005, the administration explained that it had been following a policy of not
commenting on "ongoing criminal investigations." This policy, it stated, began in the fall of
2003. Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-3.html (explaining that the
prosecutors asked McClellan to stop commenting on the investigation "[b]ack at that time
period," which is in reference to an earlier comment regarding October 2003).
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subject of an "ongoing criminal investigation."93 Two months later, the Plame
matter was referred to Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald. 94 Once Fitzgerald com-
menced his investigation, the administration stuck to its policy that it was con-
strained from commenting on the matter because it was the subject of an "ongoing
criminal investigation."95
The administration's refusal to comment, the public was told, reflected an
external constraint by which the administration was inconveniently bound. Vice
President Richard Cheney, when asked by a reporter when he first heard Plame's
name, responded in typical fashion:
I have been constrained for the last 2.5 years not talking about
that case because there was an investigation under way. And
now with a trial pending, I think it would be inappropriate for
me to say anything about it at all, so I have not said anything
about it and won't.... There will be a time when I can discuss
it, but not now.96
A similar tone was commonly evoked by Bush's press secretaries: "It has nothing
to do with whether or not I want to comment on anything that was previously said.
There will be an appropriate time to talk about all this. 97 Like their counterparts in
9' For examples of the White House referring to silence as a presidential policy, see Press
Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 18,2005), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-1.html ("[Blut as you know... ourpolicy
is not to comment on an investigation while it's ongoing. And that means any question
relating to it." (emphasis added)); Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y
(July 11,2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-
3.html ("[O]ur policy continues to be that we're not going to get into commenting on an
ongoing criminal investigation from this podium." (emphasis added)). Despite the Bush
policy, the administration commented in general terms on ongoing investigations in a series
of other incidents. For example, the President weighed in on the issue of guilt in the state
matter involving Tom DeLay and in the federal matters concerning former congressman
Duke Cunningham and former lobbyist Jack Abramoff. See Special Report with Brit Hume:
Bush Talks with Brit (FOX News television broadcast Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Bush
Interview] (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,178760,00.html).
9 See Letter from James B. Comey, Acting Att'y Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald (Dec. 30,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/agletter December_30
_2003.pdf.
9' See, e.g., Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051018-1.html.
96 Interview by Terry Moran with Richard Cheney, Vice President, Nightline (ABC
broadcast Dec. 18, 2005) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Richard Cheney Interview].
17 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 12, 2005), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050712-4.html; see also Press
Briefing, President George W. Bush (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse
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the Clinton administration, they laced presidential silence regarding independent
investigations with attitudinal terminology:
I think the President has had a very principled and responsible
stand to not comment on the ongoing criminal matter in any
way, shape, or form, and that has been his position. It's been
the-it's a responsible one, it's a principled one, and that's what
he's done.98
The administration has adhered to this policy of constraint for over four years.
Within this period, it has commented on the Plame matter but once: the President,
when commuting Libby's jail term, made a brief statement that he was compelled
to act because the sentence imposed had been excessive. 99 The next day, however,
the White House made clear that the policy of not commenting on the Plame
investigation, due to its ongoing nature, remained in full force.100 It should be noted
that, except for Libby's commutation, the policy of silence has been rigorously
followed by the Bush administration. 1
2. Justifications for the Constraint
When reviewing the record closely, one will find that the Bush administration
has proposed three alternative policy justifications for the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint. First, the administration has several times claimed that
White House comments will undermine the presumption of innocence for criminal
targets or defendants. Vice President Cheney stated that "[Scooter Libby]'s entitled
to the presumption of innocence, and from my perspective it would be totally
inappropriate for me to comment, period."'0" Following Libby's conviction, Bush's
.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-1 .html ("I would like this to end as quickly as possible
so we know the facts, and if someone committed a crime, they will no longer work in my
administration.").
98 Press Briefing, Dana Perino, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070306-5.html.
" Statement by the President on Executive Clemency for Lewis Libby (July 2, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070702-3.html (explaining
that he was commuting Libby's jail sentence to zero days because the sentence imposed by
the judge was excessive).
100 Press Briefing, Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (July 3, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070703-6.html.
'0' At this point, it would be unsurprising if Bush and his advisors refused to comment on
the Plame matter through the end of his presidency. The administration has explained that,
despite Libby's commutation, it will not comment on the matter so long as Libby is
appealing his convictions. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
102 Richard Cheney Interview, supra note 96 (emphasis added).
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press secretary commented that "our view is that you have an ongoing legal pro-
ceeding, and we're very wary of saying anything that may prejudice the rights of
Scooter Libby as he proceeds to seek a retrial or an appeal."'
0 3
Second, the administration stated that public comments from the White House
would undermine respect for the rule of law. President Bush explained that "it is very
important for people not to prejudge the investigation based on media reports.... I
will be more than happy to comment on this matter once the investigation is
complete."' 4 Similarly, Press Secretary McClellan remarked, "I'm not going to
comment on news reports that come out in the middle of an investigation or during
an investigation, because that could just prejudge the outcome of the
investigation.''105 Press Secretary Tony Snow, in June 2006, in a tone echoing that
of Hillary Clinton eight years earlier, said:
[L]et's also try to figure out what the facts are. I'm simply not
going to be talking about [whether an allegation] smacks of this
or smacks of that when neither you nor I has seen the evidence,
neither you nor I has heard the prosecution or the defense,
[neither] you nor I has seen any of the documents. That would
be moral grandstanding, and I think we owe it to ourselves to
figure out what the facts of the case are, and we all may be able
to draw appropriate morals at the appropriate time. 06
Third, the administration has explained that silence is a way to conceal pro-
secutorial strategy. Bush's press secretaries have often uttered that "[t]his is an on-
going investigation. I think that the officials in charge would prefer that questions
be directed to them."' ' This same justification has been alternatively stated as follows:
'03 Press Briefing, Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 7,2007) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070307-4.html.
04 Press Conference, President George W. Bush (July 13, 2005), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2005/07/20050713-3.html. Five days later, Bush commented
that:
We have a serious ongoing investigation here. And it's being played
out in the press. And I think it's best that people wait until the
investigation is complete before you jump to conclusions. And I will
do so, as well. I don't know all the facts. I want to know all the facts.
The best place for the facts to be done is by somebody who's spending
time investigating it.
Press Conference, President George W. Bush (July 18, 2005), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-1 .html.
05 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 12, 2005) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050712-4.html.
06 Press Briefing, Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (June 2, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060602-5.html.
07 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (June 24, 2004), available
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The prosecutors overseeing the investigation had expressed a
preference to us that one way to help the investigation is not to
be commenting on it from this podium. And so that's why we
are not going to get into commenting on it while it is an ongoing
investigation, or questions related to it.'
In sum, the Bush administration, building on the attitudinal terms used by the
Clinton administration, has adopted a rigid policy of not discussing matters that are
the subject of an "ongoing criminal investigation." The administration explained
that its silence is required to maintain presumption of innocence, rule of law, and re-
spect for the prosecutorial blueprint. The following paragraphs explore the reaches
of the Bush constraint.
3. The Scope of the Expanded Constraint
Broad swaths of information can be withheld by the expanded version of the
"ongoing criminal investigation" constraint. Take, for example, the Plame matter,
which was particularly limited in subject matter. The Special Counsel had been
charged to conduct an independent investigation regarding allegations that White
House officials illegally disclosed the covert status of a CIA operative to reporters,
and the sole indictment filed in the matter alleged only that a grand jury witness,
Scooter Libby, obstructed justice and committed perjury. Despite the tailored scope
of the investigation and prosecution, the Bush administration claimed that the
"ongoing criminal investigation" constraint barred them from addressing the
following topics:
" The scope of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint."°9
* The apparent inconsistency of recognizing a constraint after having
previously commented on investigations."'
at http:llwww.whitehouse.govlnewslreleases/2004/06120040624-3.htnl.
108 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available
at http:/www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2005/07/20050711-3.html.
109 Q: ... [Y]ou acknowledge that he is free, as President of the United
States, to take whatever action he wants to in response to a credible
report that a member of his staff leaked information. He is free to take
action if he wants to.
Mr. McClellan: Again, you're asking questions relating to an ongoing
investigation ....
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available at
http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-3.html.
110 Q: Scott, I mean, just-I mean, this is ridiculous. The notion that
you're going to stand before us after having commented with that level
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• The willingness of the President to fully discuss the matter following
the completion of the investigation."'
• The likely response by the President if one of his aides would be
charged as a result of the investigation." 2
• The President's confidence in White House advisors who were under
investigation.'' 3
• The results of internal White House investigations into the allegations." 4
of detail and tell people watching this that somehow you decided not
to talk. You've got a public record out there. Do you stand by your
remarks from that podium, or not?
Mr. McClellan: And again, David, I'm well aware, like you, of what
was previously said, and I will be glad to talk about it at the appropriate
time.
Id.
"' Q: When the leak investigation is concluded, does the President believe
it might be important for his credibility, the credibility of the White
House, to release all the information voluntarily that was submitted as
part of the investigation, so the American public could see what
the-what transpired inside the White House at the time?
Mr. McClellan: This is an investigation being overseen by a special
prosecutor. And I think those are questions best directed to the special
prosecutor. Again, this is an ongoing matter; I'm just not going to get
into commenting on it further at this time. At the appropriate time,
when it's complete, then I'll be glad to talk about it at that point.
Id.
112 "Q: ... [Ihf in the administration someone did disclose this information, what action
is the President prepared to take against that individual?... Mr. McClellan: Well, this in an
ongoing investigation, John, and I'm going to direct further questions to the officials in
charge of the investigation." Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (June
24,2004), available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040624-3.html.
"13 "Q: Does the President continue to have confidence in Mr. Rove? Mr. McClellan:
Again, these are all questions coming up in the context of an ongoing criminal investigation.
And you've heard my response on this." Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House
Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
07/ 20050711-3.html. Over the next few days, however, McClellan seemed to capitulate
that this was not sufficiently related to the investigation and commented that the President
had confidence in all of his advisors. Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press
Sec'y (July 13, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/
20050713-9.html.
"14 Q: Has the Vice President assured the President that neither he, nor
anyone in his office had anything to do with this? You said that you
received assurances last year from Lewis Libby and Karl Rove. Has the
President received similar assurances from the Vice President?
Mr. McClellan: John, there's an ongoing investigation right now.
Those questions are best directed to the officials in charge.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (June 24, 2004), available at
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" The reaction of the White House to the allegations and the investigation. 15
* The remedial measures implemented by the White House. " 6
" The ethical (rather than legal) implications of the alleged conduct."17
* The President's reaction to claims that the allegations were eroding the
credibility of the White House."
18
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040624-3.html.
115 Q: Scott, last week there was a story in The New York Daily News, I
think, that you-the question is accuracy-a question about-or a story
about the President dressing down Karl Rove. So it would not be
inconsistent if you thought that The New York Times story was
inaccurate for you to say that?
Mr. McClellan: Again, I'm just not going to have further comment on
an ongoing investigation, and I indicated that at that time, as well.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051025-1.html.
116 Q: ... So are you saying that he's not going to do anything about this
until the investigation is fully over and done with?
Mr. McClellan: Well, I think the President has previously spoken to
this. This continues to be an ongoing criminal investigation.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-3.html.
Q: What is his problem? Two years, and he can't call Rove in and find
out what the hell is going on? I mean, why is it so difficult to find out
the facts? It costs thousands, millions of dollars, two years, it tied up
how many lawyers? All he's got to do is call him in.... Why doesn't
he ask him?
Mr. McClellan: I'll tell you why, because there's an investigation that
is continuing at this point ....
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 18, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-2.html.
117 Q: But, Scott, there's a difference between what's legal and what's
right. Is what Karl Rove did right?
Mr. McClellan: ... The best way to help the investigation come to a
successful conclusion is for me not to get into discussing it from this
podium.... I don't think that helps advance the investigation.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 12, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050712-4.html.
118 Q: When the leak investigation is concluded, does the President believe
it might be important for his credibility, the credibility of the White
House, to release all the information voluntarily that was submitted as
part of the investigation, so the American public could see what
the-what transpired inside the White House at the time?
Mr. McClellan: This is an investigation being overseen by a special
prosecutor. And I think those are questions best directed to the special
prosecutor. Again, this is an ongoing matter; I'm just not going to get
into commenting on it further at this time.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 11, 2005), available at
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" The personal recollections of the press secretaries."9
* The President's reaction to the conduct of the Special Counsel. 20
* The President's sympathy for victims of the matter under investigation. 12
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-3.html.
Q: Scott, back on the Rove question, you are continuously saying it's
an ongoing investigation. But it's also an ongoing news story that has
opened up what has been described as a credibility gap here. Do you
not sense-is there no sense here that perhaps you, the President and/or
Karl, need to say something more about this situation to close that gap?
Mr. McClellan: Well, Bob, I think that if I started getting into questions
relating to this investigation, I might be harming that investigation from
moving forward.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 12, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050712-4.html.
"' "Q: So at this point, you can tell us that you don't know for a fact that you were dealt
with truthfully when you came out here in October-. Mr. McClellan: I'm just not going to
comment any further, thanks." Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Oct.
25, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051025-1.html.
120 Q: ... You said several weeks ago that Special Counsel Peter [sic]
Fitzgerald was handling the CIA leak investigation in a very dignified
way. Yet some of your Republican supporters have recently suggested
he may be an overzealous prosecutor, or one obsessing over legal
technicalities. Have you revised you [sic] thinking on this issue?
The President: Nedra, I also said-this may be the fourth time I've
been asked about this, which I appreciate, you're doing your job-I'm
not going to comment about it. This is a very serious investigation, and
I haven't changed my mind about whether or not I'm going to
comment on it publicly.
Press Conference, President George W. Bush (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051024-1 .html.
121 Q: No, no, no, no. This has nothing to do with the investigation. This
is about the leak and the effects on this family. I mean, granted there
are partisan politics being played, but let's talk about the leak that came
from the White House that affected a family.
Mr. McClellan: And let me just say again that anything relating to an
ongoing investigation, I'm not going to get into discussing. I've said
that the past couple of days.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 13, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050713-9.html.
Q: Dana, you said the President is saddened by this. Is he saddened by
the fact that a former top advisor in this building is facing this personal
problem? Or is he saddened by the fact that a former advisor is
convicted of lying in a federal investigation?
Ms. Perino: He was saddened for Scooter himself, personally, and for
Scooter's family.
Q: He's not saddened that his top advisor lied to-was found guilty of
lying to investigators?
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* The President's reaction to public comments by Republican party
officials regarding the merits of the allegations.
122
The constraint has not only been applied to unrelated or peripheral subject
matters, but also has been applied over attenuated periods of time. Traditionally, the
force of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint dwindles with each passing
phase of the criminal justice process. To put it generally, the constraint is at its apex
during the pre-indictment phase, weakened slightly during the prosecution, and
dramatically dissipated at the conclusion of trial.123 At the point where all related
trials have concluded, the only pressing confidentiality concerns are to protect
confidential informants and facilitate future pre-decisional deliberations of govern-
ment agents. 24
The Bush administration, however, has claimed that the constraint is absolute
throughout investigations, trials, and appeals. For instance, on the day Libby was
convicted, the administration notified the press corps as follows:
Scooter Libby's attorneys just announced that they are going to
ask for a new trial and . . . failing that, they will appeal the
verdict. And so our principled stand of not commenting on an
ongoing legal investigation is going to continue. I know that's
going to be very disappointing for many, but that is the decision
that we're going to-that we've made, and the decision-and
the practice that we're going to continue on the way forward.' 25
Ms. Perino: He's saddened for Scooter. We're not going to comment
on the trial.
Press Briefing, Dana Perino, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070306-5.html.
122 Q: Does the President believe it's appropriate for the RNC to continue
to weigh in on this matter? They put out another memo today, with a
top-10 Joseph Wilson lies. If indeed it's an ongoing investigation and
it's improper for the White House to discuss it, does he think it's
proper for the Republican Party to weigh in on it?
Mr. McClellan: You know, Geoff, I appreciate the question, and as you
heard me say yesterday, we are not going to prejudge the outcome of
the investigation based on media reports.
Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (July 14, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050714-5.html.
123 See discussion infra Part III.B.
114 See discussion infra Part III.B.
'25 Press Briefing, Dana Perino, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070306-5.html. The Press Secretary
went on to remark, "I think you have to let the appeals process play itself out." Id.
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There are significant consequences to extending the constraint to cover
independent matters under appeal. Depending on the jurisdiction, the direct appeals
process following a criminal conviction can take somewhere between twelve and
eighteen months.'26 The appeals process is oftentimes further protracted in cases,
like Libby's, where the defendant maintains large litigation resources.' 27 Setting
direct appeals aside for the moment, there have been no assurances from the White
House that it believes the constraint will not extend to post-conviction litigation (be
it habeas corpus or civil actions).
The Bush administration's interpretation of the "ongoing criminal investigation"
constraint has the potential to significantly obstruct democratic self-governance. A
power-maximizing President, for instance, could respond to allegations of
corruption with the following steps: (1) appoint a Special Counsel; (2) signal to the
targeted official that he should not discuss the matter with investigators; (3) permit
the targeted official to be prosecuted for contempt; and (4) if the official is
convicted, pardon him before he is jailed, or at the conclusion of the administration,
whichever is first. Throughout the entire process, the White House can refuse to
address any facet of the controversy by simply citing to the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint. All the while it can suggest that it wants to exonerate
itself (and the aide) but is not permitted to do so. The seemingly external nature of
the constraint placates the public: sensing that everything which can be done is
being done, it waits passively for the resolution of the investigation, thereby bypass-
ing alternative means of collecting information (e.g., hearings, impeachment, and
obstruction of the President's policy agenda). 2 ' The administration can effectively
'26 For example, in Wisconsin, "[t]he average felony case takes approximately two years
from sentencing to the final Court of Appeals decision." See OFFICE OF CRIME VICTIM
SERVS., WIS. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL APPEALS, http://www.doj
.state.wi.us/cvs/VictimsRights/VictimsRights-andCriminalAppeals.asp. One study
found that it takes 259 days for the average defendant to exhaust his direct appeals in New
York state court. See STUART M. COHEN, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2003), available at
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/annrpt/2003AR.pdf.
127 It should be noted that it took several years to exhaust the appeals of those officials
prosecuted in federal courts in the aftermath of Iran-Contra. See In re North, 31 F.3d 1188
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (demonstrating nine years between Iran/Contra and Oliver North's last
appeal). There is little reason to think the appellate courts will dispose of Libby's claims
prior to Bush's departure from office in January 2009.
128 As a concrete example of the public's passiveness, the first congressional hearings
regarding the Plame leak were not scheduled until the week after Scooter Libby's
conviction-forty-four months after the public first heard the allegations that the White
House facilitated the leak. See Plame to Testify to Congress on Leak, REUTERS, Mar. 9,2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0833270020070309. One could
argue that this delay is instead attributable to the Republican majority of Congress. The
timing of the subpoenas-two days after Libby's conviction-and the lack of floor speeches
by members of the Democratic minority prior to January 2007 indicate that the public felt
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delay the political fallout from the allegations to the end of the administration-a
point where there, of course, can be no real fallout.
The Bush White House has relied on an expansive form of the "ongoing
criminal investigation" constraint. The tide first began to shift with Clinton's
insinuations that commenting on the independent Whitewater investigation would
be wrong or improper. This set the foundation for a new constraint, crystalized by
the Bush administration, in which the President and his advisors claim that they are
externally constrained from publicly discussing independent investigations. This
new constraint has an enormous reach, as it has been used to justify silence on
peripheral topics about independent matters in advanced stages of the criminal jus-
tice process. This expanded constraint severely limits the press's ability to identify
evasion and thus impairs the public's enforcement of the trilemma of the ill-
motivated President. The entirety of this Article analyzes the legitimacy of the
expanded constraint.
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE "ONGOING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION" CONSTRAINT
It being clear that an expansive "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
impedes public monitoring, it is essential to identify the actual scope of the
constraint. The constraint, as has been applied by the Bush administration, seems
to be grounded in exceptionally vague principles of justice such as presumption of
innocence, rule of law, and preservation of prosecutorial strategy. And the administra-
tion has routinely resisted specific questions from the press corps about the con-
straint's origin and reach.
The "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint should not be characterized as
monolithic or homogenous. It should instead be viewed as a bundle of three discrete
executive duties. These are the obligations grounded in (1) positive law, (2)
constitutional law, and (3) the social norms of good citizenship. This Part describes
all three in detail and defines the contours of each under varying circumstances. This
sharper, more detailed, understanding of the constraint will invite, in Part IV, an
evaluation of its recent expansion to matters definitively beyond White House control.
A. The Positive Obligations
The most obvious limitations on the executive's ability to discuss certain law
enforcement matters are reflected in the positive law. These obligations are tangible
Congress was inhibited, at least somewhat, by the existence of the ongoing investigation. See
Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chair of the House Oversight Comm., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald,
Special Counsel (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20070308134201-02108.pdf.
[Vol. 16:747
GETTING AWAY WITH SILENCE
in that they are expressed in statutes, administrative regulations, executive orders, 29
and interpretive case law. A few examples of positive obligations inhibiting public
comment about criminal investigations include: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e), which sets forth explicit limitations on the government's use of grand jury
"material"; 1 30 the Privacy Act of 1974, which regulates the executive's disclosure
of discrete types of information it has gathered; 3' the plethora of subject-specific
confidentiality statutes, which require the government to protect information
regarding matters as diverse as covert operatives to census forms to personnel files;
132
and the statutory proscriptions against the obstruction of justice. 13
It is unlikely that any positive obligations have motivated Bush's expansion of
the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint. This proposition is straightforward
enough: it would have been far easier and more advantageous for him, had a
positive obligation in fact barred his comment, to simply cite to the specific law at
issue. Such positive obligations tend to come with explicit, carefully circumscribed
applicability. 13 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6, for instance, is confined to
material obtained exclusively through the grand jury, and the confidentiality statutes
apply to specific types of information, almost all of which are easily identifiable to
129 Formally, a duly promulgated executive order binds even the President unless and until
it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974).130 FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e)(2).
13' 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
132 One leading treatise refers to these as "statutory privilege[s]." CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 220 (2d ed. 1994); see, e.g.,
Census Act, 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) ("Copies of census reports which have been so retained shall
be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the individual or
establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action .. ");
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West Supp. 2007) (making tax returns
confidential and prohibiting disclosure "in any manner" of "any return or return information"
by any federal or state officer).
133 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1517 (2000). Obstruction could occur, for instance, if the President
suggested publicly that he might pardon a White House aide who was under investigation,
which could signal an obstructive quid pro quo--the target's silence about the President's
illicit involvement in exchange for the President's pardon. If, theoretically speaking, the
President had suggested to Libby that he would be pardoned in exchange for his silence, the
President would be using the pardon power to obstruct justice. See John W. Dean, The Bush
Administration's Dilemma Regarding a Possible Libby Pardon-And How Outsiders Such
as Fred Thompson Appear to Be Working on a Solution, FINDLAW, June 1, 2007, available
at http:/ www.writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20070601.html.
1' Although much of this clarity is, of course, the result of judicial interpretation. See, e.g.,
In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496,499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (interpreting the
phrase "matters occurring before the grand jury" to encompass "'the identities of witnesses or
jurors, the substance of testimony' as well as actual transcripts, 'the strategy or direction of the
investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, and the like').
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the executive branch. 35 There is simply no reason to believe that the President
would turn to the nebulous "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint if he could
alternatively have relied on one of these clear and discrete obligations. One can thus
confidently disregard the possibility that the constraint has facilitated the President's
adherence to a positive obligation.
B. The Constitutional Obligations
It is exceedingly difficult to identify all of the constitutional obligations of a
President. Nowhere will one find a comprehensive list. For instance, the federal
courts, due to their jurisdictional limitations (such as the case or controversy
requirement and abstention doctrines), have left many executive duties undefined
or unformed. Congress has also, of course, not defined the executive's obliga-
tions-its interests sometimes conflict with the public's interest in a fair and
effective executive branch (think, for example, of Congress's desire to be informed
of the intricacies of national security matters). One also cannot presume that the ex-
ecutive branch has identified and codified all of its inherent constitutional obli-
gations into orders, rules, and regulations. The executive, after all, may not have
had the occasion to consider a particular application of its obligations, or it might
not want to bind its future actions with an explicit set of rules.
Because there is no definitive record of Presidents' obligations, this Article
proceeds on a more theoretical basis. One might speculate that there are three
"constitutional" obligations which could, in any given circumstance, constrain Presi-
dents from publicly commenting about ongoing criminal investigations: (1) the
designation of the President as the Commander in Chief, 136 (2) the President's power
to pardon, 137 and (3) the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws. 138 On closer
inspection, it becomes clear that the Commander-in-Chief and Pardon Clauses do
not, as a practical matter, motivate the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint.
The Faithful Execution Clause, however, proves central to this project and will be
analyzed in an accordingly detailed manner.
1. The Commander-in-Chief Clause
Article II of the Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief
and the leader in foreign affairs. 13 This implies, among other things, a duty not to
13' This information tends to be affirmatively and knowingly collected by the government
and often is submitted or transcribed on some type of easily-identifiable government form.
136 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
"I' Id. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
131 Id. art. 2, § 3, cl. 4.
139 See id. art. 2, § 2, cl 1.
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divulge state secrets that could jeopardize national security.' 40 Although
information relating to law enforcement investigations can (and does) implicate
diplomatic, military, or national security secrets, the President's status as Com-
mander in Chief is a relatively poor explanation for the use of the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint. First, it is not aligned with the justifications advanced by
the Bush administration, which, as set forth in Part II, include presumption of
innocence, rule of law, and concealment of the prosecutorial blueprint. 14' Second,
it is unlikely that any President would turn to the "ongoing criminal investigation"
constraint to protect national security when he could just as easily cite to the state
secrets constraint, which is, in times of war, a uniquely persuasive justification for
executive activity.142 The Commander-in-Chief Clause is, for these reasons, a weak
explanation for the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint.
2. The Pardon Clause
A second provision of the Constitution which could theoretically impose a
constraint on the executive branch's ability to comment on ongoing investigations
is the Pardon Clause. 143 The Clause provides that Presidents have the power to grant
clemency for federal crimes. Most commonly, it manifests itself in the form of a
pardon or commutation of the sentence.
There are several practical problems with this explanation. First, the power to
pardon is not aligned with the Bush administration's justifications for the use of the
constraint. The failure to uphold ideals of criminal justice (like preserving the
presumption of innocence, rule of law, and prosecutorial strategy) does not in any way
impact Presidents' ability to properly exercise the pardon power. After all, clemency
is collateral to the entire criminal justice process, reserved in the arm of an executive
authority to use in his considered, but unchecked discretion-sometimes due to law,
sometimes due to justice, but sometimes due to neither. Regardless of whether a
criminal defendant receives due process in a trial or whether a prosecutorial blueprint
is unduly forecast, the President's power to pardon remains complete. 144
140 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (grounding the State Secrets Privilege
in the Commander-in-Chief Clause).
"' See supra Part II.C.2.
142 See generally Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,431 n.2 (2004) (discussing military
detention of individuals determined by the President to be a "grave danger to the national
security of the United States").
143 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
'" A prior comment could, however, have a political effect on subsequent consideration
of whether to issue a pardon. Seeing that clemency is most often granted on the President's
final day in office, these political considerations are significantly diminished.
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Second, there appears to be no instance in which a President or Attorney
General-throughout the entire history of congressional requests for executive
information-has cited the pardon power as a justification for not providing
information about an ongoing criminal investigation.'45 To the contrary, Presidents
Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton commented liberally on matters despite the high
probability that the individual subjects of their comments would be candidates for
clemency. As such, it seems unreasonable to suggest that the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint originates in this Clause.
3. The Faithful Execution Clause
Only one constitutional obligation seems to motivate the "ongoing investigation
constraint." This is the Article II clause providing that Presidents "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 4'6 It imposes on Presidents "the duty to
ensure faithful law execution using whatever constitutional powers and statutory
means are at the President's disposal.' '147 This Clause, many have argued, grants
Presidents the constitutional role of chief federal prosecutor,148 which gives them the
ultimate, albeit oftentimes nominal, power to direct federal prosecutions. 149 The
following paragraphs examine how and why the Faithful Execution Clause inhibits
presidential commenting about ongoing criminal investigations.
"' The President should not, however, comment about whether he would likely pardon
a person under investigation as this would potentially constitute obstruction of justice. This
is a limited exception. The pardon power would not, of course, inhibit a President from
commenting on the investigation so long as it did not relate to the specific issue of the
potentiality of a pardon.
146 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3, cl. 4.
14" Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REv. 1779,1837 (2006);
see Prakash, supra note 43, at 536 ("The Constitution's grant of executive power means that
the president may control law execution, including prosecutions of alleged law breakers. The
Faithful Execution Clause, by imposing a duty about how the president must use his
executive power, helps confirm that the president can prosecute alleged offenders and
thereby set the wheels of justice in motion.").
"'s See Prakash, supra note 43, at 536-37. That being said, the President's role as chief
prosecutor can be curtailed. Congress may constitutionally preclude him from directing the
day-to-day operations of particular investigations and prosecutions. He can also limit his own
participation via executive order. The Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Olson, made clear that
so long as the President retains authority to initiate a prosecution and to remove the
prosecutor for good cause, the Faithful Execution Clause is not violated. 487 U.S. 654
(1988).
141 Prakash, supra note 43, at 539 ("Taken together, the Executive Power and Faithful
Execution Clauses suggest that the president may direct official prosecutors and, in some
cases, has a duty to do so."); id. at 575 ("The president has the constitutional authority to
control prosecutors by virtue of the executive power.. ").
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a. Faithful Execution Mandates Silence
The Faithful Execution Clause dictates presidential silence about ongoing
criminal investigations. First, there are enforcement concerns. Public comments
could provide a helpful tip to a target, thereby making conviction less likely. 0 Less
directly, public exposure of an investigation would inhibit candidness between law
enforcement officials 15 ' and increase the difficulty in securing the cooperation of
essential informants and witnesses.'52
Second, public comment could negatively affect the notion of presumption of
innocence. Due to the perception that Presidents have access to information
obtained during federal investigations and prosecutions, 53 their comments could
taint the objectivity of potential jurors'54 or harm the reputations of persons who are
never ultimately charged."'
Third, such comments could violate the sanctity of rule of law. Prosecutors
must make principled and reasoned decisions throughout a criminal investigation.
When a high-level executive official speaks about a case and indicates some
15' 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46 (1941) ("Disclosure of the reports could not do otherwise
than seriously prejudice law enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or prospective defendant,
could have no greater help than to know how much or how little information the Government
has, and what witnesses or sources of information it can rely upon.").
151 If information about the prosecution's views were released, those charged with
prosecutorial decisions may "be chilled from providing the candid and independent analysis
essential to the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to the fairness and integrity of
federal law enforcement." Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct
in New England: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 510 (2002)
(statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs).
52 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46-47 (1941) ("A disclosure of the sources would embarrass
informants-sometimes in their employment, sometimes in their social relations, and in
extreme cases might even endanger their lives. We regard the keeping of faith with
confidential informants as an indispensable condition of future efficiency.").
... Prakash, supra note 43, at 521 ("As a matter of the Constitution's original understanding,
constitutional text, structure, and history establish that the president is the constitutional
prosecutor of all federal offenses whether prosecuted by official or popular prosecutors.").
"' There is a legitimate concern that pretrial publicity emanating from Congress could
have adverse effects on a prosecution. See, e.g., Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests:
Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REv. 631,646
(1997) (noting how disclosure of law enforcement information may "bias a subsequent
prosecution with pre-prosecution publicity").
"' 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 47 (1941) ("Disclosure of information contained in the reports
might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports
include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or
misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals,
the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all
know that a correction never catches up with an accusation.").
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preference about how the investigation should go, he plausibly sends mixed signals
to line prosecutors within his control who are charged with making prosecutorial
determinations. 56 Also, by releasing privileged information to the public, Presidents
might invite extraneous pressure from either Congress or the media, which could also
potentially influence prosecutors.1
57
Fourth, an implicit societal agreement would be violated if Presidents were
permitted to simply blurt out law enforcement information to the general public
under any circumstances. 58  With the power to gather information to enforce
criminal laws comes the responsibility to restrict the use of that information to
enforcement matters. Presidents are provided with robust powers to collect infor-
mation to prevent and punish criminal activity.'59 With such investigatory tools at
their disposal, it seems reasonable to obligate Presidents to channel the use of
information extracted by such tools to carefully delineated fora, such as grand juries,
discovery, and criminal trials. For these reasons, Presidents' faithful execution of
the laws require them, under at least some circumstances, to refuse public comment
about ongoing criminal investigations.
b. Parsing the Faithful Execution Clause
It is clear that the Faithful Execution Clause justifies presidential silence about
at least some parts of some ongoing criminal investigations. Moreover, it is apparent
that Presidents have been implicitly relying on this Clause. The Clause, after all,
demands silence for the very same reasons cited by the Bush administration. Also,
the term "ongoing criminal investigation" is a sufficiently proportionate way to
56 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68,76 (1986) ("[W]ell founded fears that the perception of
the integrity, impartiality, and fairness of the law enforcement process as a whole will be
damaged if sensitive material is distributed beyond those persons necessarily involved in the
investigation and prosecution process.").
' Justice Powell wrote in INS v. Chadha, "The Framers were well acquainted with the
danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one person to the 'tyranny of shifting
majorities."' 462 U.S. 919,961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON,
NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 129 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853) (1787) (expressing
concern that the legislature "[has] accordingly, in many instances, decided rights which
should have been left to judiciary controversy"); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Address Before the
Heritage Foundation, Justice Unbalanced: Congress and Prosecutorial Discretion (Aug. 19,
1993), in THE HERITAGE FOUND., THEHERITAGELECTURES No. 472 (1993) (arguing that due
process rights could be overwhelmed by congressional demands for prosecution in the
individual's case).
1' The Travelgate controversy provides a good example of a breach of this agreement.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
1' Examples include the grand jury, where documents and testimony can be subpoenaed
under threat of contempt of court, and the investigatory interview, an oftentimes intimidating
engagement whereby the subject's fears of law enforcement (and imprisonment) loom large.
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invoke the obligations of the Clause-it would be unrealistic to expect Presidents
to state this obligation with any more particularity.
Realizing that the Bush administration has been relying in part on the Faithful
Execution Clause to justify its use of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
merely begs the question: under what conditions does the Clause inhibit public
comment? Because federal courts often abstain from resolving conflicts between
the White House and Congress, the case law is of little guidance.' 6° As an alternative,
one might think to turn to internal agency guidelines, professional codes of ethics,
and prosecutorial handbooks. While such sources are helpful, they should be read
with a certain dose of skepticism. First, they do not reflect the views of all interested
parties. For example, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual is a product of the Department of
Justice only-neither the general public, the courts, nor Congress participated in the
deliberative or drafting process.' Thus there is a real concern that the executive
will overdraw the scope of its powers or will supplement the Guidelines with new
powers when circumstances so require. A second problem with relying exclusively
on these sources is that they focus only on the practices of attorneys and their
associates.'62 They do not portend to govern the President or his aides, who might
very well be regulated by a narrower constraint. A third concern is that the sources
do not claim to interpret Article HI responsibilities but instead set forth pragmatic
rules of management or aspirational rules of professional conduct.'63 For example,
the Attorney General might want to control press relations by barring his prosecutors
from speaking to the press without his express permission. This rule, of course,
does not necessary reflect the bounds of the Faithful Execution Clause but merely
the preferred management style of a particular cabinet official. For these reasons,
this study must go beyond a mere review of the applicable guidelines and
professional rules.
Ultimately, it seems that the most accurate method to identify the reaches of the
executive's obligations under the Faithful Execution Clause is through examination
160 By one commentator's count, there is only one reported case addressing an executive's
assertion of the law enforcement privilege vis-A-vis Congress. See Roberto Iraola,
Congressional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for Information Relating to
Federal Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1559, 1584 (2002)
(noting that since "[the] litigation 'raise[d] difficult constitutional questions in the context
of an intragovernmental dispute,' the court found it inappropriate to address such issues until
the circumstances indicated that judicial intervention was warranted" (citing United States
v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983))).
161 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, ch. 1-1.100 ("The Manual provides
only internal Department of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party




WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
of the "law enforcement privileges." Like the agency guidelines and professional
rules, there are no underbreadth problems: The privileges encompass at least the
entirety of the executive's duties relating to the dissemination of law enforcement
information. 64 Yet unlike agency guidelines and professional rules, the privileges
seem to present few, if any, overbreadth problems. First, the law enforcement privi-
leges apply to the President (rather than just prosecutors). Second, the privileges
have been formed over the centuries through an adversarial process-the United
States has a rich history of contentious battles between the President, Congress, and
the judiciary about the scopes of executive privileges. 165
"Executive privilege" has been defined as "the variety of privileges and
immunities, grounded in the constitutional structure of the presidency, that allows
the President to withhold information or refrain from participation in the processes
of the other branches." 166 While privileges are generally thought to protect the
holder of information only, the privileges of the Presidents-as agents of the
public-often serve to preserve the integrity of executive processes, and, in
particular, the rights of vulnerable members of society such as confidential
informants and grand jury targets. So the privileges, at least under certain
circumstances, constitute actual "obligations" on the executive. 
167
There are various forms of executive privilege, of which law enforcement privi-
leges are an important, yet relatively new, subset. It was Attorney General Robert
Jackson, who, relying explicitly on the Faithful Execution Clause, ushered in the era
of privileges over law enforcement information in 1941:
It is the position of this Department, restated now with the
approval of and at the direction of the President, that all investi-
gative reports are confidential documents of the executive
department of the Government, to aid in the duty laid upon the
'6 If the privileges did not encompass all the law information which must be concealed
under the Faithful Execution Clause, then the Clause would be regularly undermined by
Congress, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) applicants, and civil litigants. There is no
evidence that the concealed nature of this information, as it currently exists, is attributable
to the disinclination or good will of Congress, FOIA applicants, or civil litigants.
165 These disagreements are most often resolved through the process of accommodation
or judicial review.
"6 Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 632; see also Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D.
318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966) ("'Executive privilege is a phrase of release from requirements
common to private citizens or organizations'-an exemption essential to discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities.").
167 This brings to mind Posner and Vermeule's "well-motivated executive," who chooses
the policies and makes the -decisions "that voters would choose if they knew what the
executive knows." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 876-77. The President's motives
need not be pure; he must simply care about his legacy and be aware that his papers will be
released in the long run.
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President by the Constitution to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed," and that congressional or public access to
them would not be in the public interest.'
Although it is well settled that executive privilege encompasses law enforcement
information," terminological debates abound. 170 In its broadest form, it is known
as the "law enforcement investigatory" privilege or simply the "law enforcement"
privilege. Yet these terms subsume or overlap more discrete privileges such as the
prosecutorial deliberative process privilege,' 7' the work product privilege, 72 the self-
critical analysis privilege,'73 and the informants privilege. 171 Moving forward, this
Article will focus on the broad form and refer to it generically as the privilege over
law enforcement information.
75
168 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46 (1941).
169 See generally In re U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 459 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a law enforcement privilege protects government documents relating to an
ongoing criminal investigation); see also 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5681 (1992) (explaining that the
majority of circuits have recognized such a privilege).
170 As Professor Kinkopf observes, "Executive privilege is remarkably protean; it can
assume a seemingly limitless array of forms and, consequently, is difficult to grasp."
Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 631-32.
'71 "By longstanding common-law tradition ... the government's official information
privilege (often under the name 'executive privilege') covers matters of an advisory or
deliberative nature embodying opinions or recommendations and generated in connection
with government policymaking and decisionmaking functions." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 132, § 224. In order to be protected by the privilege, information must be both (1)
predecisional and (2) deliberative. See Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
172 See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) (finding that the primary
purpose of the work product privilege is to prevent exploitation of a party's efforts in
preparing for litigation).
' See Theodore R. Lotchin, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished? Establishing a
Self-Evaluative Privilege for Corporate Internal Investigations, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1137 (2004).
"' This is "the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that
law." Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). Of course the aggregate law
enforcement privilege does not include work product information that is not related to a
criminal investigation or prosecution.
' For a detailed discussion of the components and the overlapping nature of the
privileges relating to law enforcement information, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 169,
§ 5681. See also Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 633 (stating that "the courts have followed the
standard account, regarding each claim as an application of the general separation of powers
principle, rather than as a distinct privilege" and that "courts have accepted the notion that
this welter of factually disparate claims actually forms a single doctrinal category").
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To realize the contours of the Faithful Execution Clause, this Section under-
takes a relatively arduous task. It begins by inventorying the scope of the executive
privileges concerning law enforcement information. It then examines the privileges
and seeks to parse the President's obligations inherent in such privileges.'76 Finally,
it extrapolates these obligations (which are largely discerned from the executive's
relations with Congress, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) applicants, and civil
litigants) to the level of the press forum. 177 It ultimately concludes that the Faithful
Execution Clause only obligates presidential silence about those ongoing criminal
investigation matters in which the President is perceived as having at least nominal
access to, or direct influence over, the proceedings.
c. The Scope of Executive Privileges over Law Enforcement Information
A consensus has emerged regarding the limits of the law enforcement
privileges. 7 8 The law enforcement privileges have different reaches depending on
whether the subject matter relates to an open or closed investigation.' 79 If a file is
open, the privileges seem to apply to all information and statements regarding a
criminal matter handled by a government agency or department of which the
executive official is affiliated (either as a member or a supervisor). 80 There are,
however, a few narrow exceptions. The general rule does not apply to (1) officially
disclosed information such as that found in the charging papers,' 8' (2) public safety
176 Some portion of the privilege simply reflects executive power separate and apart from
any underlying obligations.
177 The press inquiry, which is the focus of this Article, places a special burden on the
executive branch. Thus it is imperative to extrapolate the contours of the obligation (as
gleaned from the privileges) to the level where the press and executive relate. See generally
Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 633-34 (distinguishing between the reach of privileges in relation
to federal courts and Congress).
178 See In re U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 459 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2006); WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 169, § 5681.
179 See 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 76 (1986) (stating that "the policy of the Executive
Branch throughout our Nation's history has generally been to decline to provide committees
of Congress with access to, or copies of, open law enforcement files except in extraordinary
circumstances").
180 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000) (providing an exemption regarding
information that will interfere with law enforcement proceedings). "The privilege is most
often invoked as to investigative materials collected in conjunction with civil or criminal law
enforcement efforts by such agencies as the Department of Justice (including the FBI) or
local police." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 132, § 225.
.8 This would include information provided through discovery without a protective order
or stated in the non-sealed charging papers, pleadings, or in the open record. See In re U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Security, 459 F.3d at 570-71 (noting a ten-factor test used to determine
the applicability of the law enforcement privilege, one of which is "whether the information
sought is available through other discovery or from other sources").
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information such as the time and place of the defendant's arrest,"' or (3) non-
identifiable information, such as statistics or studies aggregating various enforce-
ment efforts."8 3 The general rule, which applies to all members and supervisors of
the handling agency, is based on the presumption that all such officials have special
access to or influence over the matter."S Importantly, if an official had been recused
from participating in a particular matter at its outset, I8 5 he would have no access to
or influence over the matter and thus would be barred from relying on the law
enforcement privilege to withhold information regarding the matter.'86
If, on the other hand, a file is closed, the scope of the law enforcement privileges
is, roughly speaking, a direct corollary of the Freedom of Information Act.187 FOIA
provides that members of the public are entitled to copies of certain public records
for a nominal fee within a reasonable period of time.' 88 In terms of tracing the
'82 See id.
183 See id.
184 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 76 (1986) (citing the "well-founded fears that the
perception of the integrity, impartiality, and fairness of the law enforcement process as a
whole will be damaged if sensitive material is distributed beyond those persons necessarily
involved in the investigation and prosecution process").
185 This presumes that the recusal was strictly enforced and that the individual at issue did
not view official information.
186 Examples would include an individual who was the target of an investigation or, if for
some reason, the individual was asked in a hearing to speculate about the appropriateness of
a particular investigative decision in light of his experience in that department. With records,
the application of this concept for open files is relatively clear-cut: it would apply so long as
the information could be reasonably linked to an identifiable matter. It is not as easy,
however, to apply this concept when the information comes in the form of testimony. For
example, it seems that comments by a member of the investigating department which go
beyond the facts in the charging papers is necessarily based (or impossible to ensure that it
is not based) on information which remains confidential. It is therefore likely treated as
privileged information. But simply repeating public information, or discussing general
departmental information that will not impair an ongoing proceeding, is of course not a
component of the privilege.
187 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). Exemption 7 of FOIA "has been used as authority for the
existence of the privilege or as an analogy giving it shape." WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
169, at 158 (footnotes omitted); see also MLT.LER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 132, § 220
("[T]he exemptions in FOIA have considerable impact on the dimensions of government
privileges. It is clear, for example, that those exemptions limit (and probably narrowed) at least
two governmental privileges-those covering state secrets and official information.... the
latter by Exemptions 5 and 7. The reason for the limiting effect is that necessarily anything
disclosable under FOIA cannot be privileged.., for that which the Act entitles a member of
the public to obtain by suit cannot remain privileged against disclosure to a litigant, a point
which has been recognized in the cases.").
188 FOIA requires each agency to publish in the Federal Register a description of its
organizations and a list of its personnel through whom the public can obtain information. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a). Each agency must also explain the procedures by which it will furnish
information. Id.
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privileges over law enforcement information, FOIA is not underbroad, as Congress
has a traditional and strong institutional interest in forcing the executive to divulge
information about its inner workings.18 9 And it is not overbroad, as FOIA has been
upheld by the courts as not encroaching unconstitutionally upon the executive's
constitutional powers and duties. 19 The FOLA statute includes a series of exemptions
which define the scope of information that the government can withhold.' 9'
Exemption 5 provides that the executive can withhold all deliberative internal
memoranda from the Justice Department. 92 Exemption 7 ensures that executives
can withhold law enforcement information which could reasonably be expected to
(a) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (b) constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, (c) disclose the identity of a confidential source, (d) endanger
the life or physical safety of any individual, (e) deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication, or (f) disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions. 193 Any law enforcement information
falling outside of the provisions of Exemptions 5 and 7 is undoubtedly not privileged. "
This would certainly include public comments about closed matters so long as
particularly sensitive information, such as the identity of confidential sources, was
withheld.'95 It would also include comments by federal officials regarding the guilt
or innocence of persons whom had never been investigated or prosecuted by the
agency or department to which the official belonged.' 96
189 In theory there could be a Congress disinterested in strictly scrutinizing executive
functions. With a deferential legislative branch, a significant information gap would exist
between (1) congressional disclosure acts and (2) the executive privileges. Under such a
theoretical scenario, the scope of the disclosure acts would not reveal much about the scope
of privileges.
'90 See, e.g., Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1,8 (2001).
'9' 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). These exemptions protect information in both open and closed files
(though to varying degrees). "If an agency's investigatory files were obtainable without
limitation after the investigation was concluded, future law enforcement efforts by the
agency could be seriously hindered." Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1972);
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 4.
192 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5).
193 Id. § 552 (b)(7).
'" If it were otherwise, FOIA applicants could access privileged information-thus totally
undermining any value of the privilege.
195 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 4.
196 Importantly, FOIA does not govern the Office of the President-that is, the President
and his closest staff. See Kissinger v. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S.
136, 156 (1980). Congress enacted the Presidential Records Act (PRA) to regulate the public
disclosure of presidential records. See 44 U.S.C. § § 2201-07 (2000). FOIA is highly relevant
to our discussion even if it does not describe the contours of the President's privilege over
law enforcement information. The President's obligations relating to an ongoing criminal
investigation are the same as those of the Attorney General and thus can be inferred from the
obligations underlying the privileges as applied to general executive officials. See Posner &
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In sum, the law enforcement privileges extend, for open files, to all information
or speculation about that matter (so long as the information was not previously
disclosed through valid channels such as the charging papers or discovery process).
The privileges over closed files extend to all documents (and, by extension, any
comments revealing the substance of such documents) encompassed by FOIA
Exemptions 5 and 7.197 Importantly, the privileges do not apply to all members of
the executive branch but only to those who have had access to or influence over the
criminal matter at issue (which, in the case of closed files, includes those who have
previously had control over the file). In order to glean the scope of the obligations
inherent in the Faithful Execution Clause, the next paragraphs parse the executive
obligations embedded within the law enforcement privileges and then extrapolate
such obligations to the press forum.
d. The Obligations Embedded Within the Privileges
This Article's review of the law enforcement privileges indicates that, when
faced with an inquiry from Congress, civil litigants, or FOIA applicants, the relevant
executive officials can withhold (1) all information from open law enforcement
matters and (2) information from closed law enforcement matters that fall under
FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7. The "relevant" officials are those who have had access
to or influence over the investigatory matter at issue. This is the maximum potential
reach of the executive's obligation to withhold law enforcement information when
faced with a congressional, FOIA, or civil discovery request. 98 The following
paragraphs discuss the ways to parse the obligation's actual reach from this maximum
potential reach.
i. Identifying the Obligations
Information is sometimes privileged not simply because Presidents have the
power to conceal it but because they also have the obligation to conceal it. A suffi-
ciently calibrated method to identify the obligations within the law enforcement
privileges is to simply inventory which privileged information has been, over time,
Vermeule, supra note 9, at 876-77 (discussing the President's concern with history and his
knowledge that in twelve years, per the PRA, 44 U.S.C. § 2204, most or all of his currently
private information will be revealed); Cf Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2001)
(ensuring further implementation of the Presidential Records Act). But see Elena Kagan,
PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245,2335 (2001) (discussing the problem
with executive accountability during a President's second term).
197 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(5), (7).
9 See, e.g., Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that a
federal court must carefully balance the public's interest in nondisclosure against the need
of a particular litigant for access to the privileged information).
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disclosed voluntarily by the White House. That said, the executive almost never
voluntarily discloses privileged information to civil litigants or FOIA applicants.
And Congress, despite its capacity to accommodate confidentiality concerns, does
not fare much better.199 One commentator concluded that the executive branch has
disclosed files of open cases to Congress on no more than three criminal ongoing
matters. °° The Office of Legal Counsel during the Reagan administration explained:
"The policy of the Executive Branch throughout our Nation's history has generally
been to decline to provide committees of Congress with access to, or copies of, open
law enforcement files except in extraordinary circumstances." ' As to closed matters,
the executive branch is far more willing to accommodate congressional requests, but
even these disclosures are tied to assurances that the information will remain
confidential. The parties might agree, for instance, that the executive branch will
show, but not release, the requested documents; or they might agree that the
executive branch need only brief Congress on the subject matter of the documents. °2
The actual reach of the executive's obligation, as one can see, is far from clear.
It is most definitely weaker than the maximum potential, as the executive is
sometimes willing to disclose privileged law enforcement information to Congress
based on certain confidentiality assurances. But the executive's disclosure in any
given case is spongy, invariably turning on the executive's discretionary consider-
ation of factors such as the impact of release on the public interest, the strength of
the inquirer's need, and any assurances by the inquirer that the information remains
confidential. 23 As such, it seems that there can be no rule of general applicability
'9' In a detailed memorandum, Attorney General Robert Jackson listed instances dating back
to 1904 where the Attorney General had refused to supply information concerning ongoing
criminal investigations. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46-49 (1941). Jackson staked out a policy of not
accommodating Congress's interest in open files, and this policy has served as the backbone
of subsequent administrations. Id. at 47-48; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 885
('Executive officials worry that, with many legislators even on select intelligence committees,
someone is bound to leak, and it will be difficult to pinpoint the source. Aware of the relative
safety that the numbers give them, leakers are all the more bold.").
200 See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1388-1411 (2002).
20 See 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 76 (1986); see also 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 77,
83 (1989) (proclaiming that under the doctrine of executive privilege, Inspectors General,
"absent extraordinary circumstances," are not obligated to provide to Congress "confidential
information concerning an open criminal investigation").
202 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A
Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 110 (1996); Dawn Johnsen,
Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues ofMotivation andAccommodation,
83 MINN. L. REv. 1127, 1139 (1999); Marshall, supra note 34, at 807.
203 At an absolute minimum, it encompasses information protected by law, such as grand
jury material. Professor Peterson has argued that only pre-indictment open investigations
should be protected per se by the DOJ. Peterson, supra note 200, at 1446. This approach
disregards the fact that, at this phase, jurors can still be influenced, prosecutors can be
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that would define the executive's actual obligation to withhold information from
Congress, FOIA applicants, or civil litigants. For the purposes of this Article, one
should give the executive the benefit of the doubt and assume that, for those
officials who have enjoyed access to or influence over the investigatory matter,24
the obligations inherent in the law enforcement privileges extend to all information
from open files and all information from closed matters falling within FOIA
Exemptions 5 and 7.
ii. Extrapolating the Obligations to the Level of Press Relations
The subject of this Article is to define exactly how Presidents are constrained
from responding to press inquiries regarding ongoing criminal investigations. As
stated above, the obligations inherent in the law enforcement privileges arguably
extend, for those officials who have had access to or influence over the matter, to
all information from open matters and all closed matters covered by FOIA
Exemptions 5 and 7. The scopes of these obligations were defined through con-
gressional, civil discovery, and FOIA requests. But when information is sought by
the public directly and immediately, say, during a press conference, the executive's
obligation might be different.2 °" It is self-evident that the obligation to withhold
information during press conferences would be at least as broad as when Presidents
are confronted with a congressional, civil discovery, or FOIA request.206 That said,
it needs to be explored whether the obligation is perhaps broader during the press
conference. Does asking the President about an investigation in a press conference put
him in such an unusual spot that the public should give him a wide berth and, in effect,
create a buffer zone so he is not pressured into unwittingly disclosing information he
would be obligated to withhold from a congressional, discovery, or FOIA inquiry?
inhibited, and the prosecutorial blueprint can be forecast. It is hard to disagree with Peterson,
however, on the dramatic shift in interests that occurs once the matter has matriculated to the
appeals processes. See Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11-12 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (citing "the
great majority of cases which have addressed the propriety of discovery of law enforcement
[information]" and concluded that general discovery should be allowed once an investigation
and prosecution have been completed).
204 What about those individuals who are recused from a case? They of course would be
barred from divulging information they acquired through their official duties. But they would
not be prohibited by the Faithful Execution Clause from discussing the case after their
recusal so long as they did not refer to such information acquired while on the case.
205 As Professor Kinkopf points out, privileges are context-based, and as a result, one must
always consider against which entity they are asserted. See Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 633.
206 Any information released to the press would constitute a waiver of any future assertion
of privilege against Congress or the courts. See, e.g., Sherman v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 244
F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 921 F. Supp. 833, 836
(D.D.C. 1996); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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The answer seems to be yes. The press inquiry potentially inhibits the White
House's ability to preserve law enforcement information for a variety of reasons.
First, the press inquiry demands a quicker response than those prompted by
Congress, FOIA applicants, or civil litigants. Presidents normally have not, at the
time the press inquiry is made, had the opportunity to inventory all the relevant
information and deliberate the full impact of their response.2 7 Congressional, civil
discovery, or FOIA inquiries, on the other hand, are each presented in written form
and thus offer a grace period to allow the administration to undertake needed
inventory and due deliberation.2 8  This time period is essential. The Reagan
administration took the position that "inherent in the constitutional doctrine of
executive privilege is the right to have sufficient time to review subpoenaed documents
in order to determine whether an executive privilege claim should be made."2 9 It
explained that:
If the Executive Branch could be required to respond to a sub-
poena (either judicial or congressional) without having adequate
opportunity to review the demanded documents and determine
whether a privilege claim would be necessary in order to protect
the constitutional prerogatives of the President, the President's
207 See 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 77, 83 (1989) (cautioning that, in the absence of a
specific congressional request for documents, it could not advise whether a particular
document should be withheld); see also 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 92 (1986)
(emphasizing that the "decision must be based on the specific facts of the situation, and
therefore it is impossible to predict in advance whether executive privilege could or should
be claimed as to any particular types of documents").
208 For example, government agencies are obligated to respond within twenty business
days. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REFERENCE GUIDE (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/04-3.htnil; see also John Dean, The Leak of CIA
Agent Valerie Plame's Identity, FINDLAW, Jan. 30, 2004, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/ 20040130.html ("Under House Rules, a resolution of
inquiry is addressed to the head of an executive department, including the president, and
must be limited to seeking only factual information. It is considered a 'privileged' resolution
because it cannot be ignored, or easily buried. After being introduced, the resolution is
referred to the House committee with jurisdiction over the matter. The committee must report
back to the House after fourteen legislative days. At that time, it is voted on by the full
House."). In addition to its expedited nature, another difficulty of the press inquiry is that it
is less discriminating. Unlike with Congress or the courts, it seeks comments on topics that
have not been vetted by accountable individuals. While obnoxious or unfounded
congressional and civil discovery requests bring a risk of backlash from any number of
forces, the reporter is potentially anonymous and thus more dangerous. While FOIA
inquirees are not accountable, they are only seeking records-not comments.
209 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 252, 269 (1984).
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ability effectively to assert a claim of executive privilege would
be effectively nullified.1 °
Mike McCurry, one of President Clinton's press secretaries, put the same idea in more
succinct and colorful terms: "There's not a room in the White House that's called the
Truth Room, where you go unlock the door and it's all sitting there... [ylou have to
go and collect this information and ask people their memories and assemble the
kinds of records and materials that have been requested. ' 1 '
During this initial time period, when it is not yet definite which information is
obligated to be concealed and whom this obligation governs, the executive should
be especially cautious. 2 Thus, to extrapolate the White House's obligation, discerned
in the previous Section, to the press forum, one should focus on the perceivable
obligation. Because the scope of the discerned obligation turns on the distinction
between exempted and non-exempted information (e.g., it extends to all information
relating to open cases and only that part of closed cases protected by FOIA
Exemptions 5 and 7) and parsing exempted information from non-exempted
information takes time, the obligation in a press forum should extend to all
information concerning open and closed matters. This will effectively insulate the
210 Id.; see also The Petroleum Import Fee: Dep't of Energy Oversight: Hearings Before
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. 1-8 (1980) (statements of Tony
Moffet, Chairman, and Thomas Newkirk, Deputy General Counsel, Dep't of Energy)
(demonstrating the Carter administration's refusal to comply on the ground that it needed
sufficient time to review the documents before deciding whether to invoke executive privilege).
211 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.clintonfoundationorglegacy/O12298-press-briefing-by-mccurry.htm. For in-
stance, during the week that the Monica Lewinsky allegations hit the public, Clinton's press
secretary observed: "I think the President clearly would like to [respond to the allegations],
but I think he also needs to make sure that he can do it in a way that's satisfactory to them
so he can be complete and thorough and answer the questions they have." Press Briefing,
Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y (Jan. 23, 1998), available at http://www
.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/legacy/012398-press-briefing-by-mccurry.htm.
212 It can be argued, however, that the unfavorable (from the President's perspective)
conditions of the press fora are offset by the fora's favorable conditions. For example, to
benefit from the privilege in the congressional or judicial (or the exemption in the FOIA)
context, (1) a responsible government official must lodge a formal claim based on personal
consideration of the information sought; and (2) the claim must assert with particularity the
information sought to be protected and why the information falls within the scope of the
privilege. The decision to claim a privilege must be weighed carefully because, for if no
other reason, there are significant costs to not fully complying with these requirements. This
is an argument for narrowing the executive obligation in the press context (i.e., the lower the
cost of asserting the privilege, the more likely it will be abused, the narrower the privilege
should be defined). This Article, in order to give the executive the benefit of the doubt, will
disregard these arguments and proceed under the presumption that the press fora only
impedes the President in his ability to uphold his obligations.
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President from the risk of underestimating his obligation. And because the
discerned obligation governs all those who have access to or influence over the
relevant matter, the obligation at the press fora should govern individuals who
perceivably could have access to or influence over the matter. This would include
individuals who could reasonably be expected to become involved with a case at a
later point. Imagine, for example, a state prosecutor who is asked about a recent FBI
raid within his jurisdiction.
Despite the obvious problems with relying exclusively on the internal guidelines
and professional rules, as discussed earlier, it is nonetheless worthwhile to revisit
these sources for comparative purposes. The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, for example, preclude prosecutors from making "extrajudicial state-
ment[s]" that "will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.' '21 3 This exact terminology is employed by
the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.2 14 Importantly, the ABA prohibition, like the perceived
obligation inherent in the law enforcement privileges, extends only to persons "who
[are] participating or ha[ve] participated in the investigation or litigation of [the]
matter., 215 The Rules' comments explain their limited applicability as follows:
[Because] the public value of informed commentary is great and
the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary
of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the
rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved
in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.2"6
Importantly, none of the other regulations suggest that the obligation to refrain from
public comment extends to persons who have, and will likely continue to have, no
access to or influence over the relevant matter.217
213 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2006).
214 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATroRNEys' MANUAL, ch. 1-7.510 (1998) ("At no time shall
any component or personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or
information that he or she knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.").
215 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.6(a) (2006); se also id. at R. 3.8(") (stating
that the special responsibilities of a prosecutor include that he should take care to prevent
extrajudicial statements from "investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other
persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case").
216 Id. at R. 3.6(a) cmt. 3.
217 See, e.g., FLA. R. OFPROF'LCOND. 4-3.6(b) (2005) ("Counsel shall exercise reasonable
care to prevent investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or associated with a
case from making extrajudicial statements . . ."); VA. R. OF PROF'L COND. 3.6 (2000)
(applying trial publicity rules to those "participating in or associated with the investigation").
The Department of Justice Manual has a similarly limited reach. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTIcE, THE
DEP'TOFJUSTICE MANUAL, ch. 1-7.112 (1998) (providing that "careful weight must be given
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Presidents have a constitutional obligation to refrain from commenting on
certain investigations while they are ongoing, and this obligation is grounded not in
the Commander-in-Chief or Pardon Clauses, but rather exclusively in the Faithful
Execution Clause. To glean the scope of this Clause, this Article has juxtaposed
those obligations inherent in the law enforcement privileges with those set forth in
the professional and agency rules guiding prosecutors. The Faithful Execution
Clause, interpreted in its most robust manner, generally precludes the President from
commenting in the press on non-essential matters218 relating to open or closed
federal investigations.2 9 Yet even when read in the broadest of terms, the Clause
does not bind Presidents who have, and will likely continue to have, no access to or
influence over the matter at issue.
C. The Norms of Good Citizenship
The final strain of obligation within the "ongoing criminal investigation"
constraint, after the positive and the constitutional, is that based on social norms of
good citizenship. The good citizen, no matter what his official obligations might be,
does not want to rush to judgment. He respects his fellow citizen's right to the
presumption of innocence within society, does not want to undermine rule of law
by publicly criticizing investigative decisions about which he has little understand-
ing, and does not wish to call attention (if only by accident) to the likely direction
of an investigation which would allow a guilty person to elude conviction. And so
it is, that all persons, including Presidents, are bound to at least some degree by the
good citizenship obligation.22°
in each case to the constitutional requirements of a free press and public trials as well as the
right of the people in a constitutional democracy to have access to information about the
conduct of law enforcement officers, prosecutors and courts, consistent with the individual
rights of the accused.... These principles must be evaluated in each case and must involve
a fair degree of discretion and the exercise of sound judgment, as every possibility cannot
be predicted and covered by written policy statement").
218 Essential matters are those, like charging papers, disclosed in order to conduct the
prosecution or basic facts concerning public safety such as the conditions of a suspect's
apprehension.
219 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitutional Status of Customary International Law,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 68 (2006) ("With respect to text, the Faithful Execution
Clause does not reference all laws. For instance, no one thinks it references state laws.").
220 Professor Parisi has observed that:
What is legally termed a mere usage is defined in sociological literature
as a custom.., in the sense of a typically uniform activity that is not
considered to be socially necessary. Convention-the sociological notion
closest to the legal concept of custom-amounts to conduct manipulated
by express approval or disapproval by other members of the group, but
lacking the enforceability that characterizes a legal custom.
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One important point, however, is that the good citizenship obligation defini-
tively lacks the force to ever constrain a person from publicly commenting on
insinuations that he or his subordinates committed improprieties. Due to the
implications of being named as a potential target of a criminal investigation-
reputations are ruined, business prospects disappear, and personal relationships
erode-there is a long tradition in the United States of criminal suspects and
defendants arguing their cases to the people through the media.221 Society does not
criticize these public defenses-rather, it welcomes them. Moreover, defending
oneself publicly from governmental accusations of wrongdoing goes to the very
core of the public's understanding of freedom of speech.222 The Framers well
understood that comments about the functioning of the government-and in
particular its ability to restrain the liberty of persons-should be subjected to a
healthy dose of public criticism.
223
One might counter that Presidents are held to higher standards of good
citizenship than the average person, and as a result, they must refrain from publicly
commenting on all investigations--even those focusing on actions by their
administrations.22 4 But our history makes clear that the public does not discourage
Presidents from defending themselves or their associates from insinuations of
impropriety. In the last thirty-five years, we have seen Presidents Nixon, Reagan,
and Clinton take their cases to the people. While there were of course those who
criticized the content of their comments, none challenged their freedom to comment.
And although it is plausible that a public defense from a President will, in theory,
Francesco Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law 7 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal) (presented at 96th Annual Conference
of the American Political Science Association), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/
faculty/papers/docs/01-06.pdf.
221 For just a few high-profile examples, consider the public defenses of President Nixon,
President Reagan, President Clinton, Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, and baseball's Roger Clemens.
222 The President, as a "person" within the United States, is of course protected by the
First Amendment. To demonstrate that societal norms do not obligate a person to withhold
public comment, see, for example, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034 (1991)
("There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very
center of the First Amendment."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (not including witnesses as those
bound by grand jury secrecy rules); Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec'y
(Feb. 20, 1998), available at http://www.clintonfoundation.orglegacy/022098-press-
briefing-by-mike-mccurry.htm ("Q: The person who testifies doesn't have to keep it secret.
McCurry: That's correct. He can talk about his testimony, if he so chooses.").
223 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (stating that the First Amendment
"secures 'the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials"' (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964))).
224 Put another way, the argument is that the obligation is effectively constraining against
the President'because the public disapproves (even if irrationally) of a President who
comments on, and thus appears to meddle in, an ongoing investigation.
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unduly influence an independent investigation or proceeding more often than a
similar statement by say, your typical criminal suspect, 22 the chance that his
comments will have a significant influence on the direction of an investigation or
the disposition of a prosecution is de minimus. Any competent state judge or
prosecutor would reflexively and wholly disregard a comment in the press from a
President. And as for potential jurors, procedural mechanisms such as voir dire and
jury instructions adequately neutralize any prejudicial effects of pre-trial publicity.
As the Supreme Court observed in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada: "Empirical
research suggests that in the few instances when jurors have been exposed to
extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to disregard it and base their
verdict upon the evidence presented in court." '226 So it seems clear that the social
norms of good citizenship, which arguably have the potential to bind Presidents to
silence under some circumstances, can never obligate Presidents to withhold
comment about investigations in which they or their subordinates are implicated.
The "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint, once deconstructed, is shown
to be a product of two obligations: (1) those inherent in the Faithful Execution
Clause, and (2) those in societal norms of good citizenship. 27 The Faithful
Execution Clause requires the President, as chief prosecutor, to refrain from public
comment about nearly all federal investigations-but it does not inhibit him from
discussing ongoing matters in which he has, and will likely continue to have, no
access to or influence over.228 And the good citizenship obligation, stemming from
the ideals of citizenship, is so thin that it will never prevent the President from
publicly addressing allegations involving him or his subordinates.
IV. A NEW CONSTRAINT
Upon analysis of its incumbent strains, the contours of the "ongoing criminal
investigation" emerge with a certain degree of clarity. The constraint extends to all
information and statements concerning existent criminal investigations in which (1)
the President has, and will likely continue to have, no access to or influence over,
and (2) there has not been an insinuation that the President or his subordinates
225 This might be a result of the President's larger audience and a misperception in certain
comers of society that the President might have special access to or influence over state or
congressional investigations.
226 501 U.S. 1030, 1054-55 (1991) (citing; Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of
Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-
Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1989); Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision
in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News
Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515 (1977)).
. 227 This Article quickly disposed of the theory that the constraint is motivated by the
positive obligations. See supra Part IH.A.
228 See supra Part III.B.3.
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committed improprieties. This Part evaluates the legitimacy of the Bush adminis-
tration's claim that it was constrained from publicly commenting on the Plame
matter. It then goes on to unveil an easily applicable rule to which the press and
public can refer when confronted with future presidential invocations of the constraint.
A. Evaluating the Recent Expansion
1. "Independent" Investigations
Before analyzing the nature of the Plame investigation, it is worth briefly
discussing which types of investigations the President lacks access to or influence
over. If the relevant matter is not affiliated with the federal executive branch, the
issue is relatively straightforward. For example, the President never has the ability
to control investigations brought by Congress, another government, or a private
organization. Conversely, for matters handled by his cabinet or agencies, the
President nonnally has the capacity for a certain degree of access to and influence
over the investigation.229 That said, it seems clear that the President does not have
the capacity to access or influence every federal investigation.23 ° The following
paragraphs survey three types of federal investigations which are seen, at least
229 Even in such investigations, the White House regularly tries to refrain from inserting
itself into the decisionmaking processes. Regarding the expansion of the Clinton pardon
probes, the administration stated that:
[T]he matters of the Department of Justice pursuing criminal
investigations are not political decisions. They should not be made
because of or as a result of support or opposition to the thoughts of the
President. Those are decisions made by career professionals for their
reasons, and it would not be appropriate for the White House to say,
proceed or don't proceed.
Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010313.html. A few months later, the White
House observed: "When it comes to law enforcement agencies and their carrying out their
ongoing and legitimate investigations, many of which are criminal investigations, the
President does not think it is the proper course of action for the White House to tell the
Justice Department how to go about its investigations." Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White
House Press Sec'y (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/08/20010831 -15.html.
230 Peterson, supra note 200, at 1440. An early example of independent prosecutions can
be found in the 1920s. President Calvin Coolidge appointed Special Counsels to investigate
and prosecute on behalf of the government any wrongdoing related to the Teapot Dome
scandal. Coolidge named "Owen J. Roberts, a Philadelphia attorney at the time, and former
U.S. Senator Atlee Pomerene, then practicing law in Ohio," to manage the investigation.
John W. Dean, An Open Letter to Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald from Former White
House Counsel John W. Dean, FINDLAW, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/dean/.
[Vol. 16:747
GETrlNG AWAY WITH SILENCE
through the public's lens, as having at least some degree of "independence" from the
President: those pursued by Independent Counsels, Special Counsels, and Intra-
Agency Investigators.
a. Independent Counsel Investigations
Watergate was probably the seminal moment in the history of independent
prosecutors. As the scandal grew ever closer to implicating the Department of
Justice and White House, Nixon felt compelled to appoint a special prosecutor.23'
When the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, later requested Nixon's White House
tape recordings, Nixon ordered his Attorney General, Eliot Richardson, to fire
Cox. 23 2 After both Richardson and the Deputy Attorney General (who was next in
the line of succession) resigned to avoid carrying out Nixon's order,233 Cox was
fired by Robert Bork, who had become acting head of the Department of Justice
following the two resignations.234 The firing of Cox spurred Congress to later enact
the Ethics in Government Act.235
Title VI of the Act created the "independent counsel" to investigate and, if
appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking government officials for violations of
federal criminal laws. 6 The Act required the Attorney General, upon receipt of
information that he determined was "sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate
whether any person [covered by the Act] may have violated any Federal criminal
law," to conduct a preliminary investigation of the matter.237 Within ninety days,
231 Carroll Kilpatrick, President Abolishes Prosecutor's Office; FBI Seals Records, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A3 (stating that Nixon discharged Cox because he "refused to comply
with instructions" the President gave him Friday night through the Attorney General).
232 Id. at Al.
233 id.
234 Id.
235 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 591 (2000)). The Independent Counsel Act provision was re-
enacted on three occasions (with only slight modifications): Ethics in Government Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983); Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293; Independent Counsel
Reauthorization At of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732. See, e.g., Donald C.
Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2322 (1998) (dis-
cussing the origins of the Independent Counsel Act).
236 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1).
2317 Id. § 591(a). Section 591(b) sets forth the individuals who may be the target of an
investigation by the Attorney General, including the President and Vice President, Cabinet
officials, certain high-ranking officials in the Executive Office of the President and the
Justice Department, the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and certain officials involved in the President's national
political campaign. Id. § 591(b).
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the Attorney General had to report to a special court created by the Act.238 If the
Attorney General determined that there were "reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted," then he would "apply to the division of the court
for the appointment of an independent counsel. 239
Importantly, the Independent Counsel, once appointed by the judicial panel,
had "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and
prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice."2 40 Moreover, he
could only be removed from office "by the personal action of the Attorney General
and only for good cause." 24' Independent Counsel Robert Ray put it plainly: "I'm
the person who makes the judgment of whether the full power of and authority of
the U.S. government are brought to bear with regard to any prospective
defendant. '242 Although the Attorney General retained discretion to apply for an
Independent Counsel, once such counsel was appointed, neither the Attorney
General nor the President had any access to or real influence over the direction of
the investigation.243
238 Id. § 592(a)(1).
239 Id. § 592(c)(1). If, on the other hand, he does not find that there are reasonable grounds
warranting a further investigation, he must notify the panel of this result. In such a case, the
"court shall have no power to appoint an independent counsel." Id. § 592(b)(1). If he does
not report to the court within ninety days, he is obligated to apply for an independent
counsel. The application to the court "shall contain sufficient information to assist the
division of the court in selecting an independent counsel and in defining the independent
counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction." Id. § 592(d).
24 Id. § 594(a).
241 Id. § 596(a)(1). The counsel may also be removed for physical disability or mental
incapacity. Id. If removed, the Attorney General is required to submit a report to the court
and to Congress "specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such removal." Id.
§ 596(a)(2). The counsel can obtain judicial review of the Attorney General's action by filing
a civil action in federal district court, and the reviewing court is authorized to grant
reinstatement. Id. § 596(a)(3).
242 Interview by USA Today's Editorial Board with Robert Ray, Clinton Prosecution "An
Option of Last Resort" (Jan. 17, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/opinion/ncguest 1.htm).
243 The constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act was challenged in Morrison v.
Olson on grounds that it was an improper congressional aggrandizement of executive
authority. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The Court upheld the law, concluding that the Office of
Independent Counsel was sufficiently within the ambit of the executive branch. Id. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 7-1 majority (Justice Kennedy recused himself from the
case), emphasized that an independent counsel could not be appointed without executive
branch acquiescence and that the executive branch retained authority to terminate counsel
for good cause. Id. Morrison suggests that Congress can constitutionally carve Presidential
access and influence out of a federal prosecution so long as the President retains the authority
to prevent an investigation and terminate the prosecutor for good cause. Id. at 696.
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b. Special Counsel Investigations
To the relief of Democrats and Republicans alike, the Independent Counsel Act
expired in July 1999.4 In its place, the Attorney General amended the Federal Code
of Regulations to provide for the appointment of a Special Counsel.245 The Special
Counsel is more firmly situated within the executive branch than was the Independent
Counsel. The Special Counsel is selected by the Attorney General, rather than a
judicial panel, and moreover, the Special Counsel must obtain the Attorney General's
clearance before expanding the investigation.246
Yet it seems clear that the Special Counsel retains the spirit, if not the exact lines
of authority, of the Independent Counsel. First and foremost, the President has almost
no control over the Special Counsel's prosecutorial decisionmaking processes. Once
appointed, the Special Counsel has "the full power and independent authority to
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney."
24 7
Patrick Fitzgerald, for example, was explicitly given "plenary" authority to investigate
the Plame matter.248 The Special Counsel regulation states that:
The Special Counsel would be free to structure the investigation
as he or she wishes and to exercise independent prosecutorial
discretion to decide whether charges should be brought, within
the context of the established procedures of the Department. 249
Although the Attorney General may conduct oversight of prosecutorial "steps, '25 °
this authority is, as a practical matter, substantially checked by political processes.
244 See Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REv. 363, 363 (2001) ("With the
expiration of the Independent Counsel Act in June 1999, many believed this controversial
practice had become a historical footnote."); Linda Greenhouse, Blank Check: Ethics in
Government: The Price of Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1998, at WK1 (discussing
the reasons behind the Act as well as its problems).
245 A.G. Order No. 2232-99, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038 (July 9, 1999). See generally Julie
O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRlM. L. REV.
463, 483-92 (1996) (documenting the contending reasons for abandoning the Independent
Counsel Act).
246 See John R. Martin, Morrison v. Olson and Executive Power, 4 TEx. REv. L. & POL.
511, 538 (2000) ("If the Attorney General names the Special Counsel, this alleviates one of
the constitutional problems of the Independent Counsel Act-taking the appointment power
away from the Executive Branch.").
247 28 C.F.R. § 600.6 (2007).
248 Letter from James B. Comey, Acting Att'y Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald (Feb. 6,2004),
available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/ag-letterfeburary_06_2004.pdf.
249 A.G. Order No. 2232-99, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038 (July 9, 1999).
250 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b) (2007).
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After all, the Attorney General must notify Congress every time he overrides a
decision of the Special Counsel. 251 It is particularly telling that Bush's Attorneys
General never attempted to challenge Fitzgerald's investigation-particularly when
one considers that Republicans constituted a majority of Congress during each of the
critical steps in the investigation.
A second core element of the Independent Counsel retained by the Special
Counsel is job security.252 The regulations provide that "[tihe Special Counsel may
be disciplined or removed from office only by the personal action of the Attorney
General. The Attorney General may remove a Special Counsel for misconduct,
dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including
violation of Departmental policies."2 3
The Attorney General is thus severely limited in the ways he can affect a Special
Counsel prosecution. He can contain the scope of the investigation and terminate
the Special Counsel for good cause, but both of these actions require congressional
notice. So even presuming that the Attorney General acts as a simple proxy for the
President, Special Counsels, once appointed, are substantially insulated from the
White House's control.2 4 It is thus apparent that the President lacks access to or
influence over Special Counsel investigations.
c. Intra-Agency Investigations
Although not directly relevant to the Plame matter, it is worth briefly inquiring
about the independence of internal agency investigations such as those brought by
the Office of Inspectors General (OIG) and the Department of Justice's Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR). Congress passed the Inspector General Act in
the wake of Watergate. It provides: "Neither the head of the establishment nor the
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from
issuing any subpena [sic] during the course of any audit or investigation. "255 An
Inspector General may be removed from office by the President, but "[t]he President
251 Id. It is notable, but of perhaps only marginal relevance, that the Special Counsel
regulations were enacted in the Chapter entitled "Offices of Independent Counsel."
252 Id. § 600.7(d).
253 Id. Also like the Independent Counsel, the Special Counsel can hire his own staff
independent of the federal government. Id. § 600.5.
254 The constitutionality of the Special Counsel is far beyond debate. Even those who, like
Professor Prakash, advance the theory of President as chief prosecutor and vehemently
disagree with the holding in Morrison, recognize that the President can, within the bounds
of Article H, voluntarily remove himself from prosecutorial functions so long as he retains
the ultimate power to terminate prosecutorial officials for good cause. See Prakash, supra
note 43, at 575.
255 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 3 (West Supp. 2007).
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shall communicate the reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress. 256
The OPR is charged with investigating "allegations of misconduct involving
Department attorneys that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate,
litigate or provide legal advice." '257
It seems that the "independence" of these investigations from White House
influence will turn on a case-by-case analysis. Investigations by the OIG and OPR
focus on allegations of agency, rather than White House, malfeasance. Although
there are reasons why a President would elect not to access or influence an OIG or
OPR investigation, there are no legal prohibitions of such involvement. When
evaluating whether, in any given circumstance, these investigations are sufficiently
independent of the White House, one should presume that the President has
retained nominal control over the matter unless his public statements strongly
suggest otherwise.258
In sum, the old Independent Counsel and the current Special Counsel are suffi-
ciently independent from the White House in that the President lacks access to or influ-
ence over these matters. This, however, is not necessarily the case for matters handled
by intra-agency investigators, which should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
2. Evaluating the Plame Affair
Now to the issue of whether President Bush was constrained from publicly
commenting on the Plame matter. Plame' s identity was revealed in the press on July
14, 2003.9 An initial review of the allegations was commenced by the Department
256 Id.; see also DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 353
(2001).
257 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/polandproc.htm. The OPR "was
created in 1975 as one response to the revelations of ethical abuses and misconduct by
Department of Justice officials in the Watergate scandal." Id. at *1. The OPR Policies and
Procedures also set forth that "the determination whether to conduct an inquiry and/or full
investigation in a specific case is a matter of investigative judgment. Many factors are
weighed, including the nature of the allegation, its apparent credibility, its specificity, its
susceptibility to verification, and the source of the allegation." Id. at *2. "In cases in which
it finds professional misconduct (either intentional misconduct or conduct in reckless
disregard of an applicable standard or obligation), OPR ordinarily advises bar disciplinary
authorities in the jurisdiction where the attorney is licensed of its finding." Id. at *4-5.
258 For example, the Bush administration has refused to comment on the ongoing OIG
investigation of former Justice Department official Monica Goodling. See Eric Lipton,
Colleagues Cite Partisan Focus by Justice Official, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at Al. For
a discussion of the role of the Inspector General, see PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING
GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
259 Novak, supra note 88, at A21; see also Michael F. Buchwald, Of the People, By the
People, For the People: The Role of Special Grand Juries in Investigating Wrongdoing by
Public Officials, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79, 80 (2007).
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of Justice on September 16, 2003.260 It is abundantly clear that the President and
other White House officials had recused themselves from the DOJ's review. The
White House, when asked about its involvement in the Attorney General's review
of the Plame matter, affirmed that
it wouldn't be our place to get involved in that.... I'm not
aware of any contact the Attorney General has had with anyone
in this administration .... The Department of Justice is charged
with independently looking into matters like this.
2 6 1
The matter was officially referred to the Office of Special Counsel on December 30,
2003,262 at which point the White House was removed from the investigation in a
more formal, involuntary, and permanent sense.263
It is unequivocal that, once the Special Counsel was appointed, the Bush White
House was not externally constrained from publicly commenting on the Plame
matter. The first element of the constraint analysis, regarding the obligations of the
Faithful Execution Clause, is satisfied because President Bush, after Fitzgerald's
appointment, had (and would always likely have) no access to or control over the
matter. And the second element of the analysis, regarding the obligations of good
citizenship, is satisfied because the matter under investigation clearly insinuated that
the President or his subordinates engaged in improprieties. It is thus apparent that
the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint has been, and continues to be, used
in an illegitimate fashion by the Bush administration to avoid explaining its involve-
ment in the leak. While this does not mean that the administration is required to
260 See JOSEPH WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: INSIDE THE LIEs THAT LED TO WAR AND
BETRAYED MY WIFE's CIA IDENTITY 359 (2004) (reprinting Letter from Stanley M.
Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs, CIA, to Representative John Conyers (Jan.
30, 2004)) (showing that the CIA turned the Plame investigation over to the DOJ on
September 16, 2003).
261 Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y (Sept. 29, 2003), available
at http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030929-7.htm. ("There are a lot of
career professionals at the Department of Justice that address matters like this. I have made
it clear that they're the ones, that if something like this happened, should look into it. You
need to direct that question to the Department of Justice.").
262 Letter from James B. Comey, Acting Att'y Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald (Dec. 30,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/ag-letterdecember_30
_2003.pdf; Press Conference, James Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Appointment of Special Prosecutor to Oversee Investigation into Alleged Leak of CIA Agent
Identity and Recusal of Attorney General Ashcroft from the Investigation (Dec. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/12/doj 123003.html.
263 John Padilla & Alex Wagner, The "Outing" of Valerie Plame: Conflicts of Interest in
Political Investigations After the Independent Counsel Act's Demise, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 977, 980 (2004).
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speak publicly about the matter, it does, however, mean that the public should be
fully cognizant of the elective nature of its silence.
Considering the illegitimacy of the recent expansion of the "ongoing criminal
investigation" constraint, it is worth speculating as to how the White House was able
to apply the constraint to these novel circumstances with such ease. Although the
constraint has a certain degree of inherent appeal, as discussed earlier,264 the
acquiescence of the press and public is largely attributable, it seems, to the lack of
clear guidelines on the scope of the constraint. There are currently no accessible
rules by which the press and public can evaluate Presidents' uses of the constraint.
As a result, the press and public are left to muddle through a series of vague
administration explanations concerning due process and the rule of law.265
Complicating matters is the fact that the reach of the constraint is reflected in law
enforcement privileges, whose scopes are notoriously difficult to discern. Such
ambiguity leaves the press corps on seemingly shifting ground when it tries to
expose the White House's abuse of the constraint.26
B. Enforcing a New Constraint
If the Clinton and Bush administrations serve as examples, it will be essential
that the press and public at large be armed with a clear, easily applicable "rule" to
combat future Presidents who try to escape the trilemma of ill motives through
illegitimate assertions of the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint. This new
bright-line rule can be summarized as follows:
The President is not constrained from commenting on "ongoing
criminal investigations" which (1) he has lacked, and will likely
continue to lack, access to or influence over; and (2) insinuate
that he or high-level members of his administration committed
improprieties. Specifically, this would include nearly every
investigation and prosecution undertaken by a Special Counsel.
264 See discussion supra Part I.C.
265 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 169, at 187 (discussing how the investigative files
privilege "can become twisted by its uncertain justification and weak conceptual structure").
266 Compare Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec'y (Mar. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010313.html (explaining the
Clinton administration's statement on privileges), with MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL AND HISTORICAL SUBSTANTIALITY OF FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL CIVILETI'S VIEWS AS TO THE SCOPE AND REACH OF CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO
CONDUCT OVERSIGHT OFTHE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE (1993), reprinted in EPA 's Criminal
Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 12-23 (1993) (describing Congress's
"plenary power to compel information needed to discharge its legislative function").
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Any reference to the "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint
under such circumstances should be interpreted by the press
corps and general public as a euphemism for a straightforward
refusal to answer.
Through the application of this rule, the public will interpret illegitimate assertions
of the constraint as nothing more than another way of saying: "I refuse to answer."
A straightforward refusal to answer is, as discussed earlier, highly costly for
Presidents: it signals ill-motives, which heightens the suspicions of press and public
suspicions, and stokes the attention of Congress. One can see that the faithful appli-
cation of the new, tailored constraint will expose hidden forms of presidential
evasion and prompt the public to seek alternative answers to its questions.267
Importantly, there is a trickle-down benefit to this rule. Even if Presidents have
no knowledge about a matter under investigation, this rule will help the public hold
Presidents accountable for the conduct of officials working in their administration.
For example, if one of the President's aides is implicated by the investigation of a
Special Counsel and illegitimately relies on the "ongoing criminal investigation"
constraint (or avoids the press altogether), the press should draw an adverse
inference against that official due to his evasiveness. Critically, this adverse
inference forces the President's hand--either the President suffers the potential
public backlash of retaining an aide who is refusing to publicly comment, or he can
vouch for the aide's good character and conduct and thereby tie his fate to that of
his aide. Either way, the President is held at least somewhat accountable by the
public for his aide's continued presence on his staff. (As it currently stands, the
President and the aide can simply claim that it is improper for them to comment on the
ongoing investigation, which allows the President to (1) retain the aide on staff and
then, if the aide is subsequently convicted, (2) distance himself from the controversy.)
So how, one might ask, can the public enforce this tailored constraint? The
most obvious way is through concerted political pressure by the press corps. If the
rule were dutifully applied by the press, it could be integrated into press inquiries
267 See Dean, supra note 208 ("Congress was warned that its investigation could result in
an inability to prosecute wrongdoers. Nevertheless, it took that risk, and called Oliver North
and John Poindexter to testify; granted them immunity from prosecution; and compelled
them to testify about the Reagan White House's scheme of providing arms for hostages and
then forwarding the funds from the sales to the Nicaraguan Contras notwithstanding a
Congressional prohibition. Later, the Independent Counsel prosecuted and convicted North
and Poindexter despite their Congressional immunity. But their cases were later thrown out.
The court held that their immunized testimony had tainted the testimony of witnesses the
government used to prosecute them. In the end, immunity from being prosecuted based on
their Congressional testimony meant, in practice, that North and Poindexter were immune
from being prosecuted at all. The North and Poindexter case showed how Congress's
decision to immunize witnesses could thwart later attempts to prosecute them.").
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during White House briefings and then communicated to the public in corresponding
news stories. A second enforcement option would be to pressure presidential
candidates to commit themselves to the tailored constraint during election
campaigns. 21 In an effort to distinguish themselves from ill-motivated candidates,
well-motivated candidates naturally undertake commitments that are more relatively
costly to the ill-motivated.269 While not all election promises are enforceable through
political pressure, some of course are.27° Think, for example, of George H.W. Bush's
infamously breached promise to not raise taxes during his term.27' A third option
would be the enactment of a congressional resolution stating that the "ongoing
criminal investigation" constraint has no applicability to Special Counsel matters,
and as a result, any presidential utilization of the constraint during such matters
constitutes evasive behavior.
CONCLUSION
The "ongoing criminal investigation" constraint on public commenting, as
applied to Presidents, has a definite scope. It does not extend to investigations
which (1) the President has lacked, and will likely continue to lack, access to or
influence over; and (2) insinuate that he or his associates committed improprieties.
The practical impact of this finding is that Presidents are almost never externally
constrained from publicly commenting on matters pursued by Special Counsels,
which, by their very nature, are independent of Presidents' control and insinuate that
Presidents or high-level members of their administrations committed
improprieties.272 This new approach, which isolates a heretofore hidden form of
executive evasiveness, closes a large loophole in the trilemma of ill motives and
will, if duly followed by the press corps and public, facilitate stricter public
monitoring of the Presidents of the United States.
268 Perhaps analogously, it has been suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by
the people to bind themselves against their own decisionmaking pathologies. See JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-47 (1979).
269 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 900 ("Public promises that inflict reputational
costs on badly motivated behavior help the well-motivated executive to credibly distinguish
himself from the ill-motivated one.").
270 See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567 (1996) (offering
suggestions for holding officials legally accountable for their campaign promises).
271 Andrew Kohut, Voters Forget (Unless They Don't), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at Al 7
("In 1992 voters remembered that George Bush had broken his 'read my lips' pledge not to
raise taxes, any many people who normally voted Republican defected to Ross Perot,
ushering in the Clinton era.").
272 This would, of course, only apply to the President whose administration was under
investigation. It would thus not bar a President from commenting on a Special Counsel's
investigation into the activities of a previous administration.
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